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Abstract
Responding to an international trend that regards the state as an oversized, unsustainable and
uneven jurisdiction that cannot effectively intervene in the economy to promote development ob-
jectives, nor impose a proper presence over its territory and population, the reform of the Colom-
bian Constitution in 1991 installed local development as one of the primary strategies to recuperate
the nation-building project in Colombia. Bogota´ has greatly benefited from the introduction of this
normative framework: within the spatial limits of its jurisdiction, Bogota´ has been able to achieve
a remarkable level of community engagement, measured urban growth and financial stability, as
well as high per capita levels of education, health and public utility provision. However, the suc-
cessful decentralization of state activity in Bogota´ has implied an intensification of the systemic
violence that traditionally accompanies nation-building projects. Through practices of classifica-
tion, demarcation and disciplining of space and subjects, Bogota´ has used a cartography of legal
and illegal urban spaces in order to circumscribe its developmental target. Reflecting upon the
contradictions that arise from the encounter between the weaknesses of Colombia’s sovereignty
and Bogota´’s successful development, this paper examines the relationship between development
and sovereign consolidation through the multiplication of levels of governance and the creation of
increasingly smaller, more accountable sub-national jurisdictions in Third World states.
KEYWORDS: decentralization, development, nation-building, sovereignty, local development,
legal city, illegal city, Colombia, Bogota´
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To choose to decentralize, in most settings, requires a leap 
of faith rather than the application of science. To devote 
hundreds of millions of dollars to persuading others to 
decentralize, given the current state of knowledge, seems 
odd to say the least. 
Daniel Treisman (2007)1 
 
While our goals are global, they can most effectively be 
achieved through action at the local level. 




In recent decades, the city of Bogotá has experienced a remarkable urban renewal, 
even as there has been a striking increase in internal migration to the city and a 
deterioration of living conditions across Colombia due to widespread economic 
distress and violence. Bogotá’s success has been framed by the 1991 Colombian 
Constitution’s commitment to decentralize the state’s administration and 
development.3 Responding to an international trend that perceives the state as an 
oversized, unsustainable and unevenly developed jurisdiction that inefficiently 
exercises sovereign presence over its territory and population, the new 
                                                 
1 D. Treisman, The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 6. 
2 United Cities and Local Governments, Kofi Annan recognises role of local governments in 
international development (10 September 2005), available at: <http://www.cities-
localgovernments.org/uclg/index.asp?pag=newsD.asp&L=EN&ID=90>, accessed 12 December 
2008. 
3 This paper examines the use of territorial decentralization for development purposes in the 
context of state reform during the 1980s and 1990s in Colombia. The scope of this paper does not 
allow me to address in detail other forms of decentralization that have accompanied this process, 
such as the redistribution of functions within the central government and the transfer of state 
responsibilities to semi-autonomous public authorities, private corporations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). See on these other forms of decentralization in Colombia since the 1980s, 
A. Angell, P. Lowden and R. Thorp, Decentralizing Development: The Political Economy of 
Institutional Change in Colombia and Chile (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); J. H. 
Díaz (ed.), Descentralización y Superación de la Pobreza en los Países Andinos (Bogotá: 
Panamericana, 2002); K. O’Neill, Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in 
the Andes (New Cork: Cambridge University Press, 2005); D. I. Restrepo, “Las Fracturas del 
Estado en América Latina”, in D. I. Restrepo (ed.), Historias de Descentralización: 
Transformación del Régimen Político y Cambio en el Modelo de Desarrollo – América Latina, 
Europa y EUA (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2006), pp. 13-40. See on a critical 
view about the relation between decentralization and the development success of Bogotá, A. 
Gilbert and M. T. Garcés, Bogotá: Progreso, Gobernabilidad y Pobreza (Bogotá: Universidad del 
Rosario, 2008). 
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constitution devolved administrative and financial autonomy to sub-national 
territorial units.4 Planning and implementing development within municipalities 
has become one of the primary strategies to recuperate the nation-building project 
in Colombia.5 Using Colombia’s legal framework for decentralized development, 
Bogotá has been able to achieve a remarkable level of community engagement, 
measured urban growth, financial stability and the highest levels of education, 
health and public utilities coverage in the nation. Indeed, Bogotá has become an 
international example of how development can be fostered in an increasingly 
urbanized world.6  
                                                 
4 See especially, Colombian Constitution 1991, Tittle I, De los Principios Fundamentales, and 
Tittle XI, De los Habitantes y del Territorio. The first article of the Constitution affirms that 
Colombia is a Social Rule of Law State, organized as a united Republic, decentralized, constituted 
by autonomous local territories, democratic, plural, and based on popular participation. See 
especially on development and decentralization, arts. 1, 7, 223, 287, 311, 320-330. See generally 
on development, arts. 65, 70, 71, 80, 150, 151, 189, 200, 298, 300-306, 311, 313, 315, 317-319, 
320, 322, 325, 330, 333, 334, 339-344, 346, 352, 355, 361. See especially on the meaning and 
limitations of “territorial autonomy” in the 1991 Colombian Constitution, A. Trujillo Muñoz, 
Democracia y Territorio: El Ordenamiento Territorial entre Derecho y Política (Bogotá: Siglo del 
Hombre Editores, 2007). 
5 In this paper the concept of nation-building conveys the political as well as the cultural processes 
that seek to maintain the state’s ability to function. Nation-building is understood as a process that 
is common to all states and a process that is never finished. I am not placing my discussion in the 
narrower definition of nation-building as an activity undertaken by external actors (foreign states, 
international organizations or development aid agencies) attempting to build, or re-build, the 
institutions of a state, usually following some form of intervention – such as an UN peacekeeping 
operation. This understanding of nation-building has been commonly identified as state-building. 
See on the use of nation-building as state-building, J. Dobbins et al., The Beginner’s Guide to 
Nation-Building (RAND Corporation, 2007), available at:  
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG557.pdf>, accessed 26 January 2009. 
See on the use of development in state-building, A. Whaites, States in Development: 
Understanding State-Building (Working Paper, Department for International Development 
(DFID), UK, 2008), available at: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/Expert-feedback.pdf>, 
accessed 26 January 2008. See on state-building as opposed to nation-building, S. Chesterman, 
You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 4-5. See especially on the uses and differences between 
nation-building and state-building in the context of Third World states, M. Berger, From Nation-
Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and the 
Changing Global Order, 27 Third World Quarterly 1 (2006), 5-25. 
6 Bogotá’s development success has been recognized in different contexts. As an example of good 
development practice in an increasingly urbanized Third World, Bogotá’s attention to building and 
rehabilitating public spaces for development purposes was highlighted in the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) report, State of World Population: Unleashing the Potential of Urban 
Growth (2007). Bogotá was awarded the Golden Lion Award at the 10th Biennale di Venezia, 
2006, in the category of Cities, Architecture and Society. Bogotá was also awarded the Cities with 
Heart 2004 prize by United Nations Volunteers (UNV), UN-Habitat and the Inter-American 
Development Bank's Initiative on Social Capital, Ethics and Development. The city received the 
Cities with a Heart award for its programme Bogotá without Hunger, part of the larger Local 
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In this context, Bogotá appears to confirm the emergence of a new post-
national development paradigm.7 According to this view, development in its 
multiple guises becomes possible when the sovereign weakness of Third World 
states – the inefficiency of the national economy and state bureaucracy, excessive 
national interference in the market, and the disempowerment of citizens – is 
addressed at the local level.8 The locality, constituted by both the local 
government and local citizenry, is identified as the adequate space to deal with 
market and government failures that have been inherited from decades of state-
driven development. Economic, institutional, political, legal, environmental, 
human and cultural development are all presented as feasible objectives within a 
local milieu. 
Anwar Shah and Sana Shah identify, for instance, the possibility of fostering 
good governance practices at the local level, which can build ‘vibrant, living, 
                                                                                                                                     
Development Plan Bogotá without Indifference (2004-2008). The Cities with a Heart award 
nomination statement noted that the city’s programme Bogotá without Indifference ‘acknowledges 
the responsibility of local government to meet basic needs while also encouraging a sense of 
solidarity and social inclusion among all sectors of the population’ and its ‘outstanding 
achievements in engaging residents through voluntary action in urban development projects, 
especially in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’. Bogotá has also received 
special recognition for public governance practices as Experiencia Ejemplar de Gobernabilidad 
(2000) by the United Nations Development Programme and at the World Bank Urban Forum 
2005. In relation to sustainable transport solutions, the mayor of Bogotá, Enrique Peñalosa (1998-
2001), received Stockholm Partnerships for Sustainable Cities and The Stockholm Challenge 
Award in 2000 in recognition of the success of Bogotá's car-free day. In relation to education and 
culture, the Gates Foundation awarded Bogotá with the Access to Learning prize in 2002. The city 
was named as the Iberoamerican Capital of Culture 2007 at the XXI Asamblea de la Unión de 
Ciudades Capitales de Iberoamérica; and the Book World Capital 2007 by UNESCO. In terms of 
security, UNESCO also awarded Bogotá with the City of Peace 2002-2003. Finally, due to its 
success in terms of human development, Bogotá was chosen for the first city-wide Human 
Development Report: United Nations Development Programme, Informe de Desarrollo Humano 
para Bogotá (2008), available at: <http://www.idhbogota.pnud.org.co/>, accessed 14 October 
2009. 
7 The concept of “post-national” encapsulates in the paper the body of scholarship and 
practitioners’ manuals that describe decentralization and local development as the cornerstones of 
a new way of thinking about development beyond the figure of the nation-state. See for instance 
on literature that identifies the local level as the most adequate space to foster development today, 
T. Campbell and H. Fuhr (eds.), Leadership and Innovation in Subnational Government: Cases 
Studies from Latin America (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2004); J. Beall and S. Fox, Cities and 
Development (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
8 I use the concept Third World in this paper, even though I am aware that the term encapsulates 
and homogenizes heterogenous realities. My use of the term, however, conveys power/knowledge 
dynamics that sustain the developmental classification of certain states as part of the Third World. 
See especially, A. Gupta, Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of 
Politics, and the Imagined State, 22 American Ethnologist 2 (1995), 375-402. 
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working, and environmentally preserved self-governing communities.’9 Locally, it 
is not only possible to ensure the effective provision of essential services; good 
local governance is also, according to these authors, ‘about preserving the life and 
liberty of residents, creating space for democratic participation and civic dialogue, 
supporting market-led and environmentally sustainable local development, and 
facilitating outcomes that enrich the quality of life of residents.’10 Supporting the 
local jurisdiction as the most adequate spatial and political platform for 
development, the Habitat Agenda (1996), likewise, declared that social, economic 
and environmental development can be achieved ‘through the effective 
decentralization of responsibilities, policy management, decision-making 
authority, and sufficient resources, including revenue collection authority, to local 
authorities, closest to and most representative of their constituencies.’11 For the 
Habitat Agenda, which is representative of a body of international soft law 
promoting the decentralization of development, sustainable development is 
achieved by recognizing the locality as the site of an intricate civilizing dance 
between government, territory and population; and, further, by devolving 
authority for the planning, administration and financing of development from the 
state to the local level. In these descriptions, however, the reconfiguration of the 
state through the localities – as opposed to its dissolution – is elided. Moreover, 
the intensification of violence that sustains nation-building projects, and the 
material practices of classification, demarcation and disciplining that ensure 
sovereign presence, in this case through the process of decentralization, are 
overlooked.12 
                                                 
9 A. Shah and S. Shah, “The New Vision of Local Governance and the Evolving Roles of Local 
Governments”, in A. Shah (ed.), Local Governance in Developing Countries (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 2006), p. 2. 
10 Ibid. 
11 UN-Habitat, Habitat Agenda (1996), para. 177. The Habitat Agenda is the main political 
document that was formulated at the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat 
II) in Istanbul, Turkey (3 to 14 June 1996) (A/CONF.165/14, 1996). However, the first UN 
document promoting the decentralization of state functions and development responsibilities is the 
Stockholm Declaration, United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 1972). See also, Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, United 
Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat I) (A/CONF.70/15, 1976); Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (Agenda 21), United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 1992), Chapter 7: Promoting Sustainable Human 
Settlement Development, Chapter 28: Local Authorities' Initiatives in Support of Agenda 21 
(Local Agenda 21); Declaration on Cities and Other Human Settlements in the New Millennium, 
General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/S-25/2, 2001); General Assembly Resolution (A/56/206, 
2001); Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, United Nations, World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (A/CONF.199/20, 2002); UN-Habitat, Guidelines on Decentralization 
and the Strengthening of Local Authorities (2007). 
12 See on efforts to remedy the lack of attention to the transformation of the state through the local 
level, G. Mohan, Adjustment and decentralization in Ghana: A Case of Diminished Sovereignty, 
286
The Law and Development Review, Vol. 2 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://www.bepress.com/ldr/vol2/iss1/art11
  
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that local development interventions 
in Colombia, and in many other parts of the South where the decentralization of 
development has lately occurred, cannot be understood from a post-national 
framework.13 Instead the paper argues for a critical understanding of local 
development as a transplant of the nation-state’s anxieties about territorial and 
population control into local geographies.14 
                                                                                                                                     
15 Political Geography 1 (1996), 75-94; S. A. Radcliffe, “Imagining the State as a Space: 
Territoriality and the Formation of the State in Ecuador”, in T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds.), 
States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2001), pp. 123-148; J. Ferguson and A. Gupta, Spatializing States: Toward an 
Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality, 29 American Ethnologist 4 (2002), 981-1002. 
13 For instance, in Latin America alone Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela and many Central American nations have devolved development responsibilities to 
sub-national jurisdictions in the last 20-30 years. The same trend has been occurring in South East 
Asia, Asia and Africa. See on the case of decentralization in Latin America, J. Manor, The 
Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1999); E. 
Willis, C. Garman and S. Haggard, The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America, 34 Latin 
America Research Review 1 (1999), 7-56; K. Eaton, Politics Beyond the Capital: The Design of 
Subnational Institutions in South America (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004); M. 
S. Grindle, Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good 
Governance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Angell, Lowden and Thorp 
(2001), supra note 3; Díaz (2002), supra note 3; O’Neill (2005), supra note 3; Restrepo (2006), 
supra note 3. See generally on the promotion of decentralization across the Third World, S. Yusuf, 
W. Wu and S. Evenett (eds.), Local Dynamics in an Era of Globalization: 21st Century Catalysis 
for Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); P. Bardhan and D. Mookherjee (eds.), 
Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2006); G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelly, “From Government Decentralization to Decentralized 
Governance” in G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelly (eds.), Decentralizing Governance: Emerging 
Concepts and Practices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 1-20; F. 
Miraftab, C. Silver and V. A. Beard (eds.), Planning and Decentralization: Contested Spaces for 
Public Action in the Global South (New York: Routledge, 2008); United Cities and Local 
Governments and The World Bank, Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World – First 
Global Report (2008), available at: 
<http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/gold/gold_report.asp>, accessed 12 December 2009; 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), The Online Sourcebook on 
Decentralization and Local Development (Swiss Agency for Development, FAO, UNDP, World 
Bank and German Agency of Technical Cooperation), available at: 
<www.ciesin.org/decentralization>, accessed 28 November 2008; Shah and Shah (2006), supra 
note 9; Treisman (2007), supra note 1, pp. 1-6. 
14 Even though there is a significant body of scholarship and technical literature promoting and 
examining decentralization, there are almost no systematic critiques of the model. Engagement 
with the subject is normally done in order to improve the decentralization process. In particular, 
decentralization rhetoric and practices have mostly passed unexamined within critical development 
studies and the author is not aware of other critical analyses of decentralization, or development 
use of space to achieve its objectives, within legal studies or the Law and Development field. See 
as exceptions in the Latin American context, C. A. de Mattos, La Descentralización, una Nueva 
Panacea para Impulsar el Desarrollo Local?, 25 Estudios Regionales (1990), 49-70; Restrepo 
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The decentralization process does not mark the end of the state, nor its 
national form. Central governments, and the international agencies of which they 
are constitutive members, have themselves dismantled state functions and 
transferred them to a local elite and an increasingly private and transnational 
sector.15 This has been executed partly with the aim of recovering the state’s 
presence across territory and population, but also as a response to an economic 
context that is increasingly critical of the state’s capacity to intervene directly in 
the market and to new modes of capital accumulation that are no longer 
compatible with the mechanics of the nation-state. This new economy operates on 
the basis of market and financial flexibility, which pays close attention to sub-
national geo-strategic advantages and the importance of local markets. In this 
context, state power and sovereign presence are translated to the local level not 
only by delegating central state functions to local governments but also by 
welcoming the market, its actors and logics, within the smaller, less populous, and 
allegedly more versatile, local landscapes. The renewed importance of the local 
level in Third World states attends thus to a new political and economic 
environment that configures the locality and its population as an updated scenario 
to manage previously national aspirations, conflicts and interests.16 This style of 
government implies that the pendulum swings between central governments 
occasionally reclaiming authority over local affairs or assigning new functions 
and obligations to local administrations and local governments devolving some 
responsibilities to the central-state level or calling for greater financial or political 
independence. These interactions between these two clusters of authority are not 
so much representative of a conflict between old and new, but are instead part of 
                                                                                                                                     
(2006), supra note 3. See on a most open critique of decentralization in the Colombian context, 
IUÉD and Paracomún, El Futuro de la Descentralización: Experiencias de Quince Años y 
Perspectivas – IV Encuentro Colombia Hacia la Paz (Geneva, 7-9 February 2003), pp. 323-334. 
See on a critical analysis of decentralization familiar to the arguments advanced in this paper, D. 
Craig and D. Porter, Development Beyond Neoliberalism? Governance, Poverty Reduction and 
Political Economy (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006); T. M. Li, “The Law of the Project: 
Government and ‘Good Governance’ at the World Bank in Indonesia” in F. Benda-Beckmann, K. 
Benda-Beckmann and J. Eckert (eds.), Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling: On the Governance of 
Law (Farham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 237-256; Mohan (1996), supra note 12.  
15 In the case of Colombia, an example of some of the new private actors, academics and public 
elite and para-state actors that have appeared since the entrance of the decentralization framework 
can be reviewed in the following publications where they present their own views of the process: 
Red de Iniciativas para la Gobernabilidad, la Democracia y el Desarrollo Territorial (RINDE), 
Memorias del Seminario, 20 Años de la Descentralización en Colombia: Presente y Futuro 
(Bogotá, 20-21 September 2006); IUÉD and Paracomún (2003), supra note 14. 
16 See for example, G. Hyden, “Challenges to Decentralized Governance in Weak States” in G. S. 
Cheema and D. A. Rondinelly (eds.), Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and 
Practices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 212-228. 
288
The Law and Development Review, Vol. 2 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://www.bepress.com/ldr/vol2/iss1/art11
  
the larger process to accommodate the figure of the nation-state within new 
historical conditions.17 
The underlying assumption of this paper is that development has always 
been deployed as part of nation-building efforts. However, while development 
continues to be formulated within the apparatus of the nation-state and to rely on 
the nation-state’s claim of absolute sovereignty over its body-politic, development 
has also led to the creation and management of alternative jurisdictional 
arrangements in order to achieve its objectives.18 Development practice, norms 
and policies permit both the idea and the actual legalization of jurisdictions that 
do not necessarily follow the national territory format, a nation-wide citizenship, 
or nation-wide sovereign control. In the case of decentralization, the purpose of 
jurisdictional formation is to create instances, however limited, of firm – yet 
flexible in relation to market forces – sovereign control, places where 
development success can be attributed to the alignment of local, national and 
global aspirations.19 Decentralization of development not only duplicates 
jurisdictions: it also multiplies the levels of governance that scrutinize and 
manage the pursuit of development goals. Nation-building and development are 
thus intimately connected, even though we see now an articulation between these 
two projects through the local jurisdiction. 
                                                 
17 See for example on re-centralizing tendencies in Colombia, D. I. Restrepo, “Economía Política 
de las Estructuras Espaciales del Estado en Colombia”, in D. I. Restrepo. (ed.), Historias de 
Descentralización: Transformación del Régimen Político y Cambio en el Modelo de Desarrollo – 
América Latina, Europa y EUA (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2006), pp. 377-385. 
18 See for example, B. Jessop, “Post-Fordism and the State”, in A. Amin (ed.), Post-Fordism: A 
Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell 1994), pp. 251-279; Id., “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to 
the Regulation of Urban Regimes: Accumulation Strategies, Hegemonic Projects and 
Governance”, in M. Lauria (ed.), Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban 
Politics in a Global Economy (Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage 1997), pp. 51-73; Id., Capitalism and its 
Futures: Remarks on Regulation, Government and Governance, 4 Review of International 
Political Economy 3 (1997), 561-581; G. MacLeod and M. Goodwin, Reconstructing an Urban 
and Regional Political Economy: On the State, Politics, Scale and Explanation, 18 Political 
Geography (1999), 697-730; Id., Space, Scale and State Strategy: Towards a Re-Interpretation of 
the New Urban and Regional Governance, 23 Progress in Human Geography (1999), 503-527; E. 
Swyngedouw, “Neither Global nor Local: ‘Glocalisation’ and the Politics of Scale”, in K. Cox 
(ed.), Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local (New York: Guilford Press, 
1997), 137-166; A. Ong, Graduated Sovereignty in South-East Asia, 17 Theory, Culture & Society 
4 (2000), 55-75; L. Hooge and G. Marks, Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-
level Governance, 97 American Political Science Review 2 (2003), 233-243. 
19 See especially on the recent attention to measure decentralization as a governance indicator 
‘because it enables central governments to monitor the [development] performance of provincial 
and local governments’, The World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 2008), p. 266, available at:  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:2172542
3~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>, accessed 26 January 2009. 
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While co-ordinated, multi-level jurisdictional arrangements and 
decentralized systems of governance are not uncommon in political history, my 
argument in this paper is that reading decentralization and local development as 
natural stages within a generic history of territorial administration obscures their 
role within a particular modern narrative that ascribes the failure of Third World 
states to achieve development to their lack of effective sovereign control over 
territory and population.20 According to this narrative, states remain 
underdeveloped, and their sovereignty weak, for as long as they lack a consistent 
and even sovereign presence across both space and subjects. As Craig and Porter 
have argued, decentralization of development does not necessarily reduce the state 
and its sovereignty. Instead, decentralization allows a coordinated re-
territorialisation of the state power through the entrance of international 
development and its concomitant disciplines into Third World sub-national 
jurisdictions.21  
Here, recovering sovereign control and renewing the nation-building project 
occurs via the reconstruction of the locality as the embodiment of the state vis-à-
                                                 
20 For instance, the connection between sovereign control and development has been taken to the 
forefront of international policy analysis in the Failed State Index. Published annually by the Fund 
for Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy, the Index benchmarks a country’s statehood(ness) in 
relation to a broad array of development concerns. The Index, has given alarming signals of state 
failure across the Third World, ranking, for instance, Colombia in 2005 as an “Alert” state as 
opposed to a “Sustainable” state – which seems to be a category exclusively reserved for 
developed countries. Similarly, the London School of Economics and Political Science’s Crisis 
States Research Centre (CRSC) has defined a “failed state” as a ‘state that can no longer perform 
its basic security and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and 
borders.’ Eloquently for the CRSC a failed state ‘is one that can no longer reproduce the 
conditions for its own existence.’ Crisis States Research Centre, Crisis, Fragile and Failed States: 
Definitions Used by the CSRC (2006), available at:  
<www.crisisstates.com/download/drc/FailedState.pdf>, accessed 1 February 2009. See on the role 
of development in the determination of ‘state failure’ under International Law, D. Thürer, The 
“Failed State” and International Law, 836 International Review of the Red Cross (1999), 731-
761. See for a critical review of the concatenation of state ‘failure’ and development, A. Orford, 
The Uses of Sovereignty in the New Imperial Order, 6 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 
(1996), 63-86; A. Nandy, “State” in W. Sachs, The Development Dictionary: A Guide to 
Knowledge as Power (New Jersey: Zed, 1997), pp. 264-274; G. Rist, The History of Development: 
From Western Origins to Global Faith (New York: Zed, 2004), pp. 74-79; J. L. Beard, The 
Political Economy of Desire: Law, International Law, Development, and the Nation State (New 
York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), pp. 154-181; M. Lewis, C. Sampford and R. Thakur, 
“Introduction”, in T. Jacobsen, C. Sampford and R. Thakur (ed.), Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The 
End of Wesphalia? (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), p. 5. See for a description in which state 
failure, sovereign weakness and underdevelopment are equated, S. D. Kaplan, Fixing Fragile 
States: A New Paradigm for Development (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008); 
R. H. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the 
African Crisis, 24 The Journal of Modern African Studies 1 (1986), 1-31. 
21 Craig and Porter (2006), supra note 14, pp. 1-42. 
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vis an international order based on a growing set of prescriptions that are bundled 
together under the concept of development: for instance, friendly market policies, 
fiscal responsibility, environmentally sustainability, good local governance 
practices, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, the respect for 
property rights and the honouring of contracts, the maintenance of safe conditions 
for foreign investors and human security for residents. These prescriptions are 
crystallized in the local reality through a series of normative artefacts, such as 
supra-national decentralization guidelines as the World Bank’s Cities in 
Transition: Urban and Local Government Strategy,22 and in certain contexts, 
through National and Local Plans of Development and Local Plans of Territorial 
Order, as is the case in Colombia. These prescriptions are also integrated into 
local practices and official language, as is evident in the following statement by 
Enrique Peñalosa, ex-mayor of Bogotá (1998-2001):  
 
An idea and a vision became the axis of both Government Programmes and 
[my major’s term] Local Development Plan… Both were completed… 
obsessively following the rule of law and without improvisation or 
indecision. In order to achieve a radically new experience in Bogotá, we 
maintained a strong political will that favoured the public interest instead of 
particular dispensations. We walked away from showy populism and, in 
preference to this, we spoke to our citizens with the only valid criteria that a 
responsible government might uphold: the truth.23 
 
My use of development in this paper is therefore deliberately broad. In doing 
so, I follow the generous use of the term within the decentralization framework, 
where it not only refers to different types of technical activities but is also 
deployed with descriptive, normative and aspirational meanings. My use of 
sovereignty is also broader than its traditional normative meaning.24 Confronted 
with development as a standard of statehood(ness), exercising effective 
sovereignty at the international level today requires more than an abstract claim of 
state authority over a territory and a population: an effective sovereign presence is 
                                                 
22 C. Kessides, Cities in Transition: World Bank Urban and Local Government Strategy 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2000). 
23 E. Peñalosa Londoño, “La Bogotá del Tercer Milenio” in Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 
Bogotá a Escala Humana: La Bogotá del Tercer Milenio, Historia de Una Revolución Urbana 
(Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2000), p. 8. 
24 See especially, M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 
1975-1976 (New York: Picador, 2003); Id., “‘Omnes Et Singulatim’: Toward a Critique of 
Political Reason”, in J. D. Faubion (ed.), Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 v. 3 
(London: Penguin, 2002), pp. 298-325; Id., “Governmentality”, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. 
Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991), 87-104. 
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also required. Sovereignty is not simply a right belonging to a head of state, it is 
also an acute practice that needs to be performed at the spatial and subjective 
level if development is to be achieved. As such, sovereignty is a prerogative 
obtained once territory and population have been strategically coupled in 
governmental decisions. That the weakness of Third World states should be 
resolved through an effective sovereign presence at the local level resonates with 
Foucault’s assessment: ‘a good sovereign … is someone well placed within a 
territory.’25 
Applying this discussion to the Colombian context, and in response to the 
weakness of Colombia’s sovereignty and the nation’s failure to achieve 
development, the 1991 constitutional reform delegated administrative and 
financial autonomy to sub-national territorial units. The reforms sought to rebuild 
Colombia’s sovereign power over its territory and population by constructing a 
jurisdictional quilt. The patches of the quilt – the municipalities – were identified 
as the most effective transmitter of development, premised on the spatial 
proximity of local governments to their inhabitants and the capacity of localities 
to democratize the exercise of public administration, to provide services more 
efficiently and to compete more strategically in global markets. The reforms 
anticipated that development could be achieved locally, and that the Colombian 
state would be, as a result, newly legitimated. The Colombian territory and its 
population were administratively fragmented into municipalities in order to 
achieve effective development and a re-colonisation by sovereign power.26 Bogotá 
benefited enormously from this normative framework because it allowed the local 
administration to increase representation over its population and control over its 
territory while effectively targeting the subjects of its development initiatives. 
Nonetheless, the city’s success has been exclusive. In order to manage the city’s 
burgeoning informal fringes, which have traditionally been the areas that receive 
Colombians displaced by the country’s ongoing internal conflict, Bogotá has used 
a cartography of legal and illegal spaces to define its territory and population.27 
                                                 
25 M. Foucault, Spaces of Security: The Example of the Town. Lecture of 11th January 1978, 26 
Political Geography (2007), 51. 
26 See similar arguments about the re-territorialisation of the state in Colombia, B. Ng’weno, Turf 
Wars: Territory and Citizenship in the Contemporary State (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2007). 
27 Issues of urban illegality in Bogotá have a long history. However, illegal settlements increased 
dramatically during the second half of the twenty century. With this expansion, the city’s 
administration started to establish processes of control and partial legalization of these settlements. 
However, it was only since the beginning of the 1990s (the period that that this paper pays 
attention to) that the city assumed an active approach to the control of illegal settlements and made 
neighbourhood legalization processes a key part of the city’s development strategies. According to 
informal conversations between the author and employees of Bogotá Water Company, Bogotá’s 
illegal neighbourhoods receive an estimate of 100- to 150,000 new residents each year. The World 
Bank estimates fewer arrivals per year. According to supporting documents of a recent transaction 
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The city of Bogotá ensures a space where development can occur – the Legal City 
– by demarcating, excluding, and eventually including, in a cautious manner, its 
illegal neighbourhoods, some of which lie within the city’s official jurisdictional 
boundaries but outside its urban official perimeter, and some of which officially 
belong to neighboring municipalities and their illegal areas. All of these illegal 
settlements are referred in official and popular discourses under the umbrella 
concept of Bogotá’s Illegal City. 
The spatial and normative position of illegal neighbourhoods in relation to 
Bogotá are examined in detail in sections II.D and III. At this stage, however, I 
provide three contextual points for the reader.  
Firstly, the condition of illegality in practice entails a scarce provision of 
public services and urban infrastructure, and a material denial of the residents’ 
rights (the right to access adequate education and health services, for instance). 
While these fundamental rights are not formally withheld by Bogotá’s 
administration – and Colombia’s constitutional human rights action (acción de 
tutela) offers the possibility for redress if arbitrary treatment can be 
demonstrated28 – the citizens of illegal neighbourhoods are in fact doubly 
                                                                                                                                     
between the World Bank and Bogotá’s Mayoral Office, the number of new arrivals to informal 
areas in Bogotá since 1999 has been 266,000, and the arrivals in 2005 were only 40,000 people. 
The World Bank, Project Name: CO Bogotá Urban Services, Project Information Document (PID) 
Appraisal Stage, Report No.: AB3107, (2 May 2007), available at: <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/05/17/000013944_20070
518151947/Rendered/PDF/PID010Appraisal0Stage.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2007. According to 
Mike Davis, the Colombian conflict has added in recent years more than 400,000 internal 
displaced population to Bogotá’s urban poverty belt. M. Davis, Planet of Slums (London: Verso, 
2006), p. 49. See especially on the rise and social dynamics of Bogotá’s informal/illegal growth, E. 
S. Popko, Transitions: A Photographic Documentary of Squatter Settlements (Stroudsburg, Pa.: 
Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, 1978); Equipo de Servicios Públicos Cinep – IDE, Barrio a Barrio 
se Construye una Ciudad (Documentos Ocasionales No. 70, Centro de Investigación y Educación 
Popular – CINEP, Bogotá, 1993); ; P. Simpson, Divided Cities/Invisible Walls: Double Standards 
of Urban Life, Who has the Better Deal? (Working Paper N. 159, International Association for the 
Study of Traditional Environments, Berkeley University, 2002); N. Rueda García and D. Rueda 
Sinisterra, Desarrollo Urbano y Pobreza en Bogotá D.C. (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 
2005); Secretaría Distrital del Hábitat, Informe Técnico de Soporte de la Política Integral de 
Hábitat, 2007-2017 (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2008). See for legal recounts of the 
informal growth of Bogotá, O. Muñoz Neira, Urbanizadores Piratas (Bogotá: Ediciones Doctrina 
y Ley Ltda., 2004); D. Bonilla, Pluralismo Jurídico y Propiedad Extralegal: Clase, Cultura y 
Derecho en Bogotá, 36 Revista de Derecho Privado (2006), 20-50; A. Niño Ruiz, Formal and 
Informal Housing Practices in Bogotá, Colombia: The experience of Metrovivienda and Juan 
XXIII, 36 Revista de Derecho Privado (2006), 183-206; L. Rico Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Ciudad 
Informal: La Historia de un Barrio Ilegal (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2009). 
28 See for instance in the case of access to water, Colombian Constitutional Court, Tutela 406 
(1992), Mag. Ciro Angarita Barón. This case expressly linked access to drinkable water and 
sewage system with the right to life and human dignity. See also, Colombian Constitutional Court, 
Tutela 570 (1992), Mag. Jaíme Sanín Greiffenstein; Colombian Constitutional Court, Tutela 578 
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disenfranchised: on the one hand, by their position beyond the official boundaries 
of Bogotá, which even judicial actions can not completely overcome, especially in 
cases where the illegal neighbourhood is officially part of a neighbouring 
municipality;29 and, on the other hand, by their location within the economically 
depressed urban periphery of the city. In addition to their jurisdictional exclusion, 
citizens of illegal neighbourhoods are socially, economically and spatially 
segregated from the core of Bogotá’s development success.30 
Secondly, the residents of illegal neighbourhoods are not, as a consequence 
of their normative and socio-spatial segregation, foreign to the city’s life and 
market. They are instead a vital part of Bogotá: they provide labour to the city’s 
employers, they substantially increase the number of consumers for the city’s 
goods and services, and they actively use their neighbourhoods as a place in the 
city to pursue their projects and ambitions. They are also politically active within 
their communities, as well as in the context of the city, the Colombian nation and 
at the international level – which is often present in the life of their 
neighbourhoods through the actions of NGOs and international organizations 
(especially, in the form of programmes and projects sponsored by the UNDP, UN-
Habitat, UNHCR, and the World Bank). In all of these actions, the agency of 
illegal residents, and their resilience in front of the difficult conditions that shape 
the life of their neighbourhoods, is notorious. In the particular context of this 
paper, I approach the operation of such agency through the fact that the illegal 
residents of Bogotá remain, at the end of the day, structurally segregated by their 
normative and spatial location and the fact that their citizenship to the city is 
pending. Although it could be argued that residents of illegal neighbourhoods 
exert their agency when they act as “free riders” on the city’s services, e.g. by 
illegally connecting to the city’s water system, I would say that in doing so they 
confirm their liminal position as official outsiders of Bogotá and the new model of 
a decentralized state. As a resident and community leader of an illegal 
                                                                                                                                     
(1992), Mag. Alejandro Martinez Caballero; Colombian Constitutional Court, Tutela 244 (1994), 
Mag. Hernando Herrera Vergara; Colombian Constitutional Court, Tutela 092 (1995), Mag. 
Hernando Herrera Vergara. This jurisprudence has been confirmed and renewed by Colombian 
Constitutional Court, Tutela 1104 (2005), Mag. Jaime Araújo Rentería. 
29 See especially on the case of Altos de Cazucá, a group of illegal neighbourhoods located on 
Soacha, Bogotá’s impoverished neighbouring municipality, Tribunal Administrativo de 
Cundinamarca, Seccion Segunda, Subsección B, Alcalde Municipal de Soacha (Jesús Ochoa 
Sánchez) v José Joaquin García García, Flor Alba Tole Nieto and Jeremías Beltrán Cortés 
(Incidente de Desacato, No. 1592, 22 May 2007). The neighbourhoods that form Altos de Cazucá 
are located on the actual encounter between the jurisdiction of Bogotá and Soacha. See also on the 
constitutional discussion about the extent and limitations of public investment in illegal 
neighbourhoods in Colombia: Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia de Constitucionalidad 
1108 (2008), Mag. Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa. 
30 See especially, Secretaría Distrital del Hábitat (2008), supra note 27, pp. 51-62. 
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neighbourhood on the peripheries of Bogotá made clear during an interview with 
me: 
 
We [illegal residents of the city] move to these neighbourhoods for different 
reasons: hunger, unemployment, from violence, bad treatments … many 
things. So, people start looking for the most favourable place in the system 
of basic economy in which we live … In this way, the person that decides to 
live in one of these marginalized, sub-normal, neighbourhoods, arrives here 
to suffer necessities [lack of a proper water system, lack of infrastructure or 
schools, insecurity, etc], that they did not “always” have to put up with. 
Sometimes they suffer them unnecessarily. But due to the pressures of life or 
the abandonment of the state, people choose to come to live here and pay 
with their own blood the conditions and necessities of these 
neighbourhoods; necessities that are not just our own problem, they are also 
things of the state (cosas del estado) …31 
 
Finally, the hard binary between legal and illegal discussed in this paper is 
not an explicit disciplinary mechanism in Bogotá’s development discourses and 
governance strategies, even though these provide meticulous mechanisms for the 
management and disciplining of the city’s space and subjects. The Illegal City is 
only exposed when it impinges on the development of the Legal City, although its 
existence is often implicit in official discourse. For instance, a report declaring 
that ‘100% of the Legal City’s population has access to drinking water’ 
recognizes the Illegal City as a problematic shadow for the development of the 
Legal City, without explicitly naming it.32 When the Illegal City is directly 
identified, on the other hand, it is usually because the equilibrium of the Legal 
City has been threatened by wasteful expenditures in its illegal sibling: for 
example, when illegal connections to the Legal City’s water pipes place the 
financial success of Bogotá’s water company at risk or the location of illegal 
neighbourhoods in zones with a high risk of landslides announces a local calamity 
to which the city’s administration needs to respond.33 As a result, the legal/illegal 
                                                 
31 Interview realized by the author with a community leader in a peripheral neighbourhood of 
Bogotá in the municipality of Soacha (11 August 2009). 
32 See for example, Casa Editorial El Tiempo, Fundación Corona and Cámara de Comercio de 
Bogotá, Bogotá Como Vamos: Informe de Evaluación: Los Primeros Dos Años de la 
Administración Distrital 2004-2008 (Bogotá: El Tiempo, 2006). 
33 See for example, Empresa de Acueducto de Bogotá (EAAB), Resolución 0194: Por la Cual Se 
Establece la Forma de Cobro del Suministro Provisional de Acueducto a Usuarios Irregulares 
Agrupados (8 March 2007), available at: 
<http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=23375>, accessed 10 August 
2007. 
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binary implicit in Bogotá’s development is political in nature, even though its 
apparent structure and motion are normative.  
It is under these conditions that Bogotá’s development statutes and its 
carefully delineated frontiers have come to operate like city walls of former 
times.34 The laws that establish Bogotá’s jurisdictional boundaries define, 
distinguish and separate bodies within the urban space, creating a favourable 
topology for development. By pursuing the sustainability and integrity of its 
jurisdiction, Bogotá has marshalled an effective sovereign presence and is able to 
maintain an efficient sovereign spatial economy. I employ the expression 
‘sovereign spatial economy’ in this paper to convey the sense in which Bogotá as 
a local jurisdiction acts as a spatial configuration of power, an instrument that 
expands and contracts in response to its capacity to develop individual subjects 
while still allowing market flows to circulate over its local frontiers. Bogotá rules, 
in principle, over what it is capable of interiorising: that is, what it is capable of 
developing. The other, the illegal population that is not – or at least not yet – 
included and regularized in the official map and statistics of Bogotá, subsists in an 
unstable terrain of active expectation in relation to the city’s official development 
success.35 In its evaluation of decentralization theory, rhetoric, policies and 
practices, this paper attempts to take the exclusion, and careful integration, of 
those beyond the official development map of Bogotá into account. By 
demonstrating how Bogotá sustains its development success through the practices 
of classification, demarcation and disciplining of territory and population that 
have been implemented under the banner of decentralization, the paper aims to 
                                                 
34 Bogotá’s administration calculates that 20% of land within its official urban perimeter has an 
illegal origin. This 20% contains 2 million residents. In this way, it is still possible to find illegal 
neighbourhoods within the city’s urban perimeter/jurisdiction. These neighbourhoods are patches 
of urban informality, even though most of them are properly consolidated in terms of public 
utilities and urban infrastructure. Their illegality rests mainly on the lack of urban licenses when 
they were originally built several decades ago. Even though their illegality also has consequences 
in terms of land title issues and the impossibility to obtain urban licenses, in this paper I focus my 
attention on those illegal neighbourhoods that are in the city’s jurisdiction but beyond the urban 
perimeter of the city and the illegal neighbourhoods that are located along the city’s jurisdictional 
frontier yet are part of neighbouring municipalities. These are the most affected in terms of lack of 
public utilities, infrastructure and effective presence of health and educations services. See on the 
difference between these two kinds of illegal neighbourhoods, Bogotá, Decreto Distrital 367 
(2005), art. 7. See also, “Propiedad de sus predios reciben 1.800 familias de localidades Rafael 
Uribe Uribe y Usme”, ElTiempo.com, 12 Julio 2009, available at: 
 <http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/bogota/propiedad-de-sus-predios-recibieron-1800-familias-
de-localidades-rafael-uribe-uribe-y-usme_5622228-1>, accessed 13 July 2009. 
35 See especially, G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 18; Id., State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005).  
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problematize the decentralization fever that has gripped the Third World in the 
last decades.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the first half, I explore how 
development in Colombia evolved from being a state-driven to a locally-based 
enterprise over the past century. This section describes how development was 
questioned on the basis of the state’s inability to control its territory and 
population in an increasingly globalised economy; how the municipality has 
emerged through development norms and technologies as the redeemer of the 
state; and finally, the contradictions that are inherent in this process. In the second 
half of the paper, I turn my attention to Bogotá. Firstly, I discuss how Bogotá has 
achieved a remarkable level of urban development using the decentralized 
framework. Secondly, I examine the escalation of territory and population control 
in the city. I illustrate this point by reviewing two expressions of Bogotá’s hold 
over its territory and population: the extensive cartographic catalogue that has 
accompanied Bogotá’s development and two recent programmes of 
neighbourhood legalization. The aim of my analysis in this section is to 
understand how the reconstruction of the state at the local level in Colombia has 
furthered state-based memories of classification, demarcation and disciplining of 
territory and population. In particular, I argue that the consequences of building 
the state from the local level are neither a coincidence nor a side-effect, instead a 
decision grounded and calculated on development’s call for sovereign presence in 
Third World states. 
 
 
I .  NATION-BUILDING: FROM THE STATE TO THE LOCALITY 
 
In his inaugural address, US President Truman (1945-1953) described 
development as an international project opposed to ‘the old imperialism’.36 
Truman’s promise of development envisaged a democratic, fair-dealing 
programme, in which the wider and more vigorous application of modern 
scientific and technical knowledge would be the key to economic growth. 
Increasing productivity was identified as the key to national prosperity and a 
harmoniser of international relations. The achievements of social democratic and 
welfare models of capitalism after WWII in the North – particularly the New Deal 
in the United States and the Marshall Plan in Europe – encouraged the pursuit of 
Keynesian macroeconomic interventions in the South, which reaffirmed the role 
of Third World national administrations in the governance of their populations.37 
                                                 
36 H. S. Truman, Inaugural Address (January 20, 1949) available at: 
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm>, accessed 15 
November 2009. 
37 R. Peet (with E. Hartwick), Theories of Development (New York: Guilford Press, 1999), p. 41. 
I
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Formally, at least, developing nations possessed macro-variables in common with 
the developed world: territory, population and government. These features made 
states the preferred platforms for development, which was modelled as a 
cooperative multilateral effort rather than a camouflage for colonialism or explicit 
interventionist policies (such as the United States’ Big Stick Diplomacy over 
Central and South America during the 19th century).38 Truman’s vision of 
development heralded an international dialogue mediated through International 
Law and supra-national institutions, where the sovereign rights of individual 
nation-states to control a national territory, organize a national market in this 
space, incur in international debts, ratify multilateral economic pacts, and develop 
their populations were assumed. These normative prescriptions were accompanied 
by a particular set of technical instructions, formulated initially by Rostow, to lead 
a developing nation through sequential stages of social, political and economic 
development.39 The portrayal of development as a state-based enterprise with a 
clearly defined sequence made the message of development easy to communicate 
and appealing to national leaders.40 
The economic rationale behind development was strongly supported by a 
new international political agenda. Post-colonial nation-states – even Colombia, 
with almost 150 years of republican history – experienced a new urgency to 
promote themselves as the repository of cultural values that would resolve the 
legacy of their colonial pasts, which were plagued with regional grievances and 
territorial, cultural, racial and economic differences.41 The opportunity for Third 
World countries to act as single, fully sovereign nation-states presented a new 
avenue to ensure progress and equality within the emerging global governance 
system of the post-war period.42 Even the political polarization during the Cold 
War never went so far as to neglect the role assigned to the figure of the nation-
state in the Third World. In both its capitalist and communist guises, development 
                                                 
38 Slogan describing the United States President Theodore Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine. The term ‘Big Stick Diplomacy’ encapsulates the claim by the United States that it had 
the right not only to oppose European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, but also to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of its neighbours if they proved unable to maintain order and 
national sovereignty. See on the Big Stick Diplomacy, D. W. Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe 
Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1999); S. Brewer, Borders and Bridges: A History of U.S.-Latin 
American Relations (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006). 
39 See especially; W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 12 Economic History Review 1 
(1959), 1-16; W. W. Rostow, The Economics of Take Off into Sustained Growth (London: 
Macmillan 1965). 
40 Nandy (1997), supra note 20, p. 264. 
41 See especially on Colombia, N. P. Appelbaum, Muddied Waters: Race, and Local History in 
Colombia, 1846-1948 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). See also, Nandy (1997), supra note 
20, p. 266. 
42 Rist (2004), supra note 20, p. 74. 
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remained closely linked to the figure of the state, sovereignty and self-
determination, even if it was ‘in exchange for a right to self-definition.’43 As 
Antony Anghie has described, the Eurocentric Westphalian sovereign-state 
became ‘the agent of development’ across the postcolonial world.44 In developing 
nations, projects to improve political systems, infrastructure, population health, 
and national industries were reduced to a common international formula of nation-
building as development. Conserving a unified state became a priority, and the 
national territory and population were established as the appropriate and exclusive 
scenario for development.  
In Colombia, as in much of the Third World, recognition of the nation-state 
as the vehicle of development faced several challenges. National governments 
were accused of not representing nationwide interests and urged to become truly 
democratic in front of the diversity of their territories and population and to 
effectively embrace the new standards of governance – such as transparency and 
the protection of the rule of law. On the other hand, these same national 
governments, especially represented through national industries or centrally 
planned development projects, were increasingly seen as economically inefficient. 
Instead of promoting development, they were accused of retarding the 
achievement of better standards of living and the consolidation of functional and 
competitive national markets. The state’s retreat from direct participation in the 
economy, yet a strong presence through administrative action and strategic 
regulation, became a better form to foster development. As a result, the idea of a 
new form of state presence across territory and population took shape, in which 
local interests and realities became keys for development as nation-building. In 
the next sections, I review in detail the particularities of this transition from the 
national to local in the Colombian context. 
 
 
A.  Development in Colombia (1950s-1980s) 
 
The recent history of development interventions in Colombia is coupled to nation-
building anxieties that are both a legacy of the country’s colonial past and a 
response to the country’s violent present. Although internal conflict has been a 
consistent feature of the Colombian landscape since independence from Spanish 
rule, the intensity of violence increased during the second half of the 20th century 
when the bipartisan struggle evolved into a fratricidal war – La Violencia (1948-
                                                 
43 Ibid. p. 79. 
44 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (New York: 
Cambridge University Pres, 2004), p. 205. 
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1964) – and the nation faced a more challenging international economic outlook.45 
El Frente Nacional, a disempowering institutionalization of bipartisanship that 
lasted until the early 1970s, followed La Violencia.46 Under the political 
arrangement of El Frente Nacional, Colombian national governments engaged in 
establishing official institutions, and aggressively pursued social reform 
programmes to make the state’s presence effective across the national territory.47 
Development in Colombia was initially promoted through state-managed 
import substitution strategies. These were officially adopted under the auspices of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC).48 ECLAC’s development policies were based on the argument that 
liberal internationalism promoted a system of dependency that furthered capital 
accumulation by the already developed economies. ECLAC’s alternative route to 
development – decoupling the national economy from the international system by 
replacing industrial imports with domestic production under protective tariffs and 
promoting national industrialization – suited El Frente Nacional’s nation-building 
agenda. The policy of import substitutions enabled rural areas of the country to 
industrialize and to obtain a measure of independence from Colombia’s major 
cities, while simultaneously increasing urban household incomes and reducing 
urban violence. In these terms, import substitution strategies were an effective 
instrument to activate the nation-building project within the Colombian state.  
By mid 1970s, however, the combined effects of expanding 
industrialization, endemic violence in rural areas and the modernization of 
agriculture had led to a disproportionate growth of Colombia’s urban population. 
Although import substitution programmes had increased household wealth and 
                                                 
45 See especially, United Nations Development Programme, El Conflicto, Callejón con Salida: 
Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano para Colombia (Bogotá: Naciones Unidas, 2003), pp. 
285-319; F. Safford and M. Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); F. González, I. Bolívar and T. Vázquez, Violencia Política en 
Colombia: De la Nación Fragmentada a la Construcción del Estado (Bogotá: CINEP, 2003), pp. 
345-370; P. Oquist, Violence, Conflict, and Politics in Colombia (New York: Academic Press, 
1980), p. xi. See also, M. Roldán, Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946–
1953 (London: Duke University Press, 2002); G. Guzmán Campos, O. Fals Borda and E. Umaña 
Campos, La Violencia en Colombia (Bogotá: Taurus, 2005). 
46 See for example, B. M. Bagley, “Colombia: National Front and Development”, in R. Wesson 
(ed.), Politics, Policies, and Economic Development in Latin America (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1984), p. 124-160. 
47 See especially, G. Hoskin, “Colombian Political Parties and Electoral Behavior During the Post-
National Front Period” in D. L. Herman (ed.), Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and 
Venezuela (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 47-62; R. A. Thoumi, “Post-War and Post-National 
Front Economic Development of Colombia” in D. L. Herman (ed.), Democracy in Latin America: 
Colombia and Venezuela (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 63. 
48 See especially, A. Escobar, La Invención del Tercer Mundo: Construcción y Deconstrucción del 
Desarrollo (Bogotá: Norma, 1996), pp. 113-198. 
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improved social mobility, the legacy of violence and the capture of the state by 
the traditional political parties during El Frente Nacional had nurtured a complex 
system of interdependent conflicts that could no longer be contained. At the 
beginning of 1980s, the discourse of development, which had fuelled earlier 
governance efforts in Colombia, seemed exhausted. The technology required for 
competitive production of basic consumer goods became expensive, and often 
could only be obtained through association with foreign companies at high levels 
of public indebtedness. The emphasis on industrialization had led to a deleterious 
neglect of diversity in the agricultural sector and the concentration of agro-
investment into exportable crops, such as coffee, bananas and sugar cane. As rural 
conditions deteriorated, the highly profitable production of narcotics took hold in 
rural areas, becoming intertwined with the financial activities of guerrilla groups, 
paramilitary groups and local politicians.49  
Colombia’s internal problems were exacerbated by the global recession of 
the 1970s. The crisis that followed the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and welfare 
reform in the developed world precipitated an intellectual shift in approaches to 
the modernisation of developing nations. The regulated system of capital flows 
and global trade established at Bretton Woods in 1944 was freshly perceived to 
impede economic competency and to promote market distortions that obscured the 
impact of national debts and propped up fictitious growth. At the same time, the 
import substitution strategy of segregating a national market from the global 
economy began to be regarded as isolationist and chimerical by international and 
Colombian development agencies.50 It was no longer accepted that state-
sponsored development plans – especially those related to infrastructure and 
housing projects – would bring the enormous benefits that had previously been 
predicted.51 Opening an economy to unrestricted flows of financial capital and 
                                                 
49 F. Gutiérrez Sanín, T. Acevedo and J. M. Viatela, ‘Violent Liberalism? State, Conflict and 
Political Regime in Colombia, 1930-2006: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making’ (Working 
paper No. 19, Crisis States Research Center, London School of Economics, 2007), p. 15. 
50 See especially, Escobar (1996), supra note 48, pp. 199-254. 
51 The pinnacle policy document at this time was the Colombian National Development Plan “The 
Four Strategies” (Las Cuatro Estrategias) under president Misael Pastrana (1971-1974). The plan 
had an urban component called “Cities within the City”. The general idea of the plan was to ensure 
that through state control of the economy’s key commanding heights (promotion of exports, 
savings and employment by housing construction, and mechanization of the agriculture) and 
management of macroeconomic variables to produce a more equitable distribution of wealth, cities 
would become the nucleus of Colombia’s development and economic growth. In “The Four 
Strategies” plan, previous attempts at urban planning, from colonial times to the zoning efforts 
made during the modernisation period were considered to have been ‘inconsistent, fragmented, 
uncoordinated, negative’; therefore, the new model of national planning had to ensure 
comprehensiveness and integrity. The final objective was to promote national economic growth by 
capital accumulation and to increase industrial productivity in the cities where work and housing 
were in close proximity. Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Ciudad dentro de la Ciudad: la 
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goods, de-regularization, privatisation, reduction of state expenditure, fiscal 
discipline, tax reforms and the promotion of exports were introduced as the 
keystones of good development policy. Whereas previous efforts at nation-
building were materialized in an institutional aggrandisement of the central state 
in order to promote economic growth and inspire public imagination for a 
Colombian nation, the following years of nation-building as development were 
marked by a contractionist approach. 
For Colombia, the worldwide shift in economic thinking precipitated a 
domestic crisis with a distinctive urban character that erupted in the mid-1980s. 
Social and economic exclusion become visible through the intensification of 
grassroots activism, including organized demonstrations against public utility 
providers and the taking of private urban land to establish illegal 
neighbourhoods.52 As Colombia’s external debt grew and the state became unable 
to provide services and security across the nation, Colombia’s major cities – and 
Bogotá in particular – received a steady influx of internal migrants, even though 
local governments lacked the political and economic independence to provide 
sufficient housing or infrastructure to their new residents. By the end of the 1980s, 
Colombia’s major cities were overpopulated and hamstrung by the reduction of 
national allocations for local development investments.  
Economic liberalization, central-state contraction and state-managed 
exports, the new avenues to promote development, again faced unenviable 
prospects in Colombia. During the 1960s and 1970s, Colombia was an agro-
exporting rural country with an incipient industrial sector. While these were not 
sufficiently profitable to reverse the economic inequality that sustained the 
political violence in Colombia, both sectors were within the realm of government 
control and aligned with the project of consolidating sovereign presence across 
the country. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, Colombia’s primary exports 
became minerals and narcotics, the former highly dependent on the international 
market and the latter illegal.53 Instead of a feasible consolidation of the nation-
building project, the model of development based on exports generated a closed 
system of economic constraint, internal violence and international disciplining due 
to sanctions against Colombia. The final means for state sovereign promotion –
                                                                                                                                     
Política Urbana y el Plan de Desarrollo de Colombia (Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación, 1974). See especially on the theoretical underpinnings of this model of national 
development through urban development in Colombia during the 1970s-1980s, L. Currie, 
Urbanización y Desarrollo (Bogotá: Cámara de Comercio de la Construcción, 1988). 
52 Rueda García and Rueda Sinisterra (2005), supra note 27, p. 39. 
53 According to Gutiérrez, Acevedo and Viatela, the most reliable estimates of Colombia’s coca 
production suggest that it currently accounts for between 5% and 7% of the national GNP. This is 
significantly greater than the fraction of GNP due to coffee production (1.5%) and remittances 
(2.5%). F. Gutiérrez Sanín, T. Acevedo and J. M. Viatela (2007), supra note 49, p. 22. 
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 the capacity to control legitimately and profit from its national market and labor 
force – were diminished. 
During this period, the failure of nation-building as state development 
became a common theme in academic literature on the economy and the politics 
of violence in Colombia. According to this body of literature, the Colombian 
state’s inconsistent presence across its territory and population was, and continues 
to be, the main cause of the nation’s unrest. Versions of this hypothesis are 
usually referred to as Teoría de la Fragilidad de la Presencia del Estado, Fragility 
as a Result of the Lack of State’s Presence.54 Proponents of the theory argue that 
the drastic de-ruralisation and urbanization of Colombia during the 20th century, 
the difficulty of Colombia’s topography, the factual absence of security, the 
incapacity of the state to effectively promote and profit from market-led 
development, and the lack of utilities, basic education and public health services 
to large rural regions and impoverished urban areas have resulted in a 
discontinuous terrain of political representation – a phenomenon described by 
Gutiérrez, Acevedo and Viatela as a stateless demographic occupation.55 Under 
these conditions of institutional absence and disempowerment, the state has not 
been able to represent the collective because it lacks a territorial and subjective 
presence. Instead, the state represents both an illegitimate accumulation of power 
in the head of the national government, and a pernicious geographical jurisdiction 
that promotes a false unity, while fostering an inequitable distribution of power 
and an inefficient economic environment. As the state does not offer security, 
opportunities and services to its members, its integrity is diluted, and the presence 
and effectiveness of its sovereign power progressively eroded.  
While this geo-political description of Colombia was initially employed to 
explain the rise and consolidation of guerrilla and paramilitary groups, it also 
surfaced in official development discourse. International development agencies, as 
well as prominent Colombian legal and political figures and social movements, 
criticised the state as an archaic, bloated, and overly bureaucratic instrument for 
                                                 
54 See especially, Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, Colombia: Violencia y Democracia. 
Informe presentado al Ministro de Gobierno (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1987). See also, 
I. Rementería, “Hipótesis sobre la Violencia Reciente en el Magdalena Medio”, in G. Sánchez and 
R. Peñaranda (eds.), Pasado y Presente de la Violencia en Colombia (Bogotá: CERC, 1986), 333-
348; D. Pecaut, Colombia: Violencia y Democracia, 13 Análisis Político (1991), 35-49; Id., 
Presente, Pasado y Futuro de la Violencia, 30 Análisis Político (1997), 3-36; F. González, “La 
Violencia Política y las Dificultades de la Construcción de lo Público en Colombia: Una Mirada de 
Larga Duración”, in J. Arocha, F. Cubides and M. Jimeno (eds.), Las Violencias: Inclusión 
Creciente (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1998), 163-185; M. T. Uribe de Hincapié, 
Las Soberanías en Disputa: ¿Conflicto de Identidades o de Derechos? 15 Estudios Políticos 
(1999); Safford and Palacios (2002), supra note 45; González, Bolívar, Vázquez (2003), supra 
note 45.  
55 F. Gutiérrez Sanín, T. Acevedo and J. M. Viatela (2007), supra note 49, p. 35. 
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development.56 These critics advocated a process that would devolve political 
autonomy to sub-national territorial units, coordinate governmental interventions 
around sub-national territorial development, focus public resources, welcome 
private capital and public-private partnerships to assume previously central-state 
functions, and increase political accountability through administrative and 
financial decentralization.57 Decentralization in this form entered the social and 
political imagination as a golden opportunity for democratic and economic reform 
of the fragile Colombian state. 
 
 
B.  Development Changes Places 
 
The contestation of the state as the ideal space for development, and a preference 
for the locality as the most suitable replacement, were not unique to Colombia.58 
Rather, there was an international transformation in development and global 
governance thinking, for which The United Nations Vancouver Declaration on 
Human Settlements (1976) served as a clear normative referent. According to the 
Declaration, the provision of health, nutrition, education, security, recreation and 
other essential services in all parts of developing countries ‘should be geared to 
                                                 
56 Jaime Castro, a successful politician from Bogotá, is a good example of a local actor in the 
process of decentralizing development in Colombia. He presented, as a Senator, a proposal for 
elections of mayors in 1980s. In 1984, as Minister of National Affairs he presented the project that 
would later become the legislative act that changed the Constitution in 1986 in which the popular 
election of mayors was approved. See infra note 67. As one of the 1991 constitutional reformers, 
he promoted higher decentralization measures for Bogotá. As a mayor of Bogotá, Castro brought 
and legalized decentralization in the city through the Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá, Decreto 1421 
(1993) – See section III.A. infra of this paper for a detailed discussion of this norm. See especially, 
J. Castro, Respuesta Democrática al Desafío Guerrillero (Bogotá: Oveja Negra, 1987); Id., 
Descentralizar para Pacificar (Bogotá: Ariel, 1998). 
57 See for instance on the use of administrative, fiscal and political decentralization as a way to 
overcome the fragility of the Colombian state, G. Bell Lemus, “The Decentralised State: An 
Administrative or Political Challenge?”, in E. Posada Carbó (ed.), Colombia: The Politics of 
Reforming the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); E. Wiesner, Descentralización y 
Federalismo Fiscal (Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 1992); Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación, Evaluación de la Descentralización Municipal en Colombia: Balance de 
una Década (Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2002); A. Alesina, Reformas 
Institucionales en Colombia (Bogotá: Fedesarrollo; Alfaomega, 2001). See also on early 
decentralisation in Colombia during the 1960s-1970s, Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 
Las Finanzas Intergubernamentales en Colombia: Informe de la Misión de Finanzas Wiesner-Bird 
(Bogotá: Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 1981); F. Rojas et al, Informe Especial: 
Descentralización y Administración Municipal, 210 Revista Economía Colombiana (1988); L. F. 
López Garavito, Pensamiento Económico y Fiscal Colombiano (Bogotá: Universidad Externado 
de Colombia, 1998). 
58 See supra note 13. 
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the needs of the community and receive an effective priority in national and 
development planning and the allocation of resources.’59 The Declaration 
recommended that development should be achieved through: 
 
National equalization programmes and subsidies to provide equitable 
geographic and social accessibility to all segments of the population; 
Reorientation of legislative, institutional and financial measures, with the 
object, in particular, of bringing about the involvement of the people in 
meeting their own needs; 
Decentralization of the administrative and financial machinery [of the state] 
in order to provide a greater measure of management at the community 
level; […].60 
 
For both the international development community and Colombian political 
figures, development remained the suitable instrument to actualise sovereign 
power. But rather than departing from the macro-variables of the state (territory, 
population and government), a refined approximation to local territory and 
population now seemed to promise a more effective nation-building strategy, a 
geographical configuration more attuned to the disciplines of a ‘post-welfare state 
era’.61 As Daniel Treisman has observed, decentralization – along with 
democracy, competitive markets, and the rule of law – has come to be seen as a 
cure for a remarkable range of political and social ills.62 In a decentralised 
administrative framework, local government becomes the ideal scenario for “good 
institutions” (e.g. good governance, respect of the rule of law, protection of 
property rights and honouring of contracts) to take root and have their intended 
effects.63 By transferring responsibility for the provision of health, education, 
                                                 
59 The Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, United Nations Conference on Human 
Settlements (Habitat I), A/CONF.70/15 (1976). See especially in the Declaration, Vancouver 
Action Plan: Recommendation C.15: Social services. See also supra note 11. 
60 Ibid. 
61 R. M. Bird and F. Vaillancourt (eds.), Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. xiii. 
62 Treisman, (2007), supra note 1, p. 1. See also, Craig and Porter (2006), supra note 14, pp. 5-6. 
63 See especially on the contemporary theoretical basis for the promotion of institutions as the 
basis to enhance political and economic governance, D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change 
and Economic Performance (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See 
especially on an early appraisal of decentralization as a way to improve the institutional 
environment of local governments, D. A. Rondinelly, J. R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, 
Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience (Working Paper No. 
581, The World Bank, 1983). See especially on the role of Institutionalism, as a school of thought, 
in the promotion of the decentralization of development, Craig and Porter (2006), supra note 14. 
See for an “institutional” approximation to Colombia’s decentralization of development, Angell, 
Lowden and Thorp (2001), supra note 3, pp. 1-78. See for an official reading of Colombia’s 
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water infrastructure, housing and recreation from the state to the municipality, 
decentralization aims to transform the latter into the locus of economic 
development, and to establish a new source of legitimacy for the former.  
This new spatial dimension of development and development’s role in 
nation-building have more recently been confirmed in the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography. Faced with the 
increasing concentration of production and wealth within particular locations and, 
as a result, an increasing geographical disparity both within developing states and 
across the world, the Report recommends national development policies that are 
‘calibrated to match the difficulty of the development challenge, determined by 
the economic geography of places.’64 For the World Bank, the current challenge 
for developing states is to use instruments of economic integration (in the form of 
institutions, infrastructure and incentives) to even out the geography of 
development such that ‘living standards of people [are] more uniform across 
space.’65 The Bank’s suggestion for Third World states is to identify 
underdeveloped pockets within their national territories, to assess their 
development potential, and to devise possible solutions based on the pros and 
cons of their spatial location. Through awareness of underdevelopment’s spatial 
origins, Third World states will be able to intervene strategically across their 
national space, rectifying spatial impediments and profiting from local spatial 
advantages, while still aiming for overall national economic growth. In this 
context, decentralization is the politico-administrative avenue for Third World 
states to come into contact with the entirety of their territory and population, 
tackling underdevelopment at the local level, with local knowledge, local 
mechanisms of accountability and a hierarchy of supervision.66  
Responding to the international and domestic push for decentralization, 
Colombian President Belisario Betancur (1982–1986) passed a constitutional 
amendment for the popular election of local mayors in 1986.67 In an interview, 
President Betancur explained his support for this measure: 
 
… I had the obsession that the community should be closer to their 
representatives. I knew that as long as the community was closer to the 
                                                                                                                                     
decentralization of development from an institutional perspective, E. A. Gonzalez Salas, 
Evaluación de la Descentralización Municipal en Colombia. Componente de Capacidad 
Institutional (Archivos de Economía No. 169, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2001). 
64 The World Bank, World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2009), 1. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid, 230-259. 
67 See Colombia, Acto Legislativo 1 (1986). Since the 1886 Colombian Constitution, Colombian 
presidents had appointed the governors of departments, who in turn appointed the mayors of 
municipalities. 
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rulers, those rulers would feel more stimulated, with greater support to 
govern… If popularly elected, mayors would be freer and more efficient.68 
 
From Betancur’s belief in the positive outcomes of bringing government 
closer to the people, the 1986 constitutional amendment officially inaugurated the 
process of Colombian administrative and financial decentralization, which would 
become the driving force behind local development during the drafting of a new 
constitution in 1991.69 Democratization of the local level was also the political 
foundation that accompanied the process of economic liberalization that Colombia 
undertook during the 1990s – a process known as La Apertura, and enacted 
through President Cesar Gaviria’s Development Plan La Revolución Pacífica 
(1990-1994).70 Dismantling state control of the economy was coupled to a 
debunking of the state’s geography as the suitable territory for development. The 
central state, which had previously aspired to be a monolithic presence in its 
citizens’ daily-life, became viewed as an irrational and intrusive figure.71 
Advocates of decentralization in Colombia cited four main reasons why 
local government could successfully promote development where the state could 
not. First, localities were represented as the ‘schoolhouses of democracy’ 
envisaged by Alexander de Tocqueville: accessible, participatory and accountable 
to their electorates.72 Second, the transfer of development responsibilities from the 
state to the local level promised to increase the flow of information between local 
administrations and the people.73 Here, advocates of decentralization argued that 
bringing the government and the people closer would enable the local 
administration and private local service providers to identify the characteristics, 
needs and dissatisfactions of the people of whom they were now the direct 
representatives or suppliers, improving resource allocation through better 
knowledge of local preferences and an overall reduction of transaction costs. 
Third, decentralization would promote a healthy economic competition among 
                                                 
68 T. G. Falleti, A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative 
Perspective, 99 American Political Science Review 3 (2005), 338. 
69 Restrepo (2006), supra note 17, pp. 370-373. 
70 See especially, M. Urrutia, “Economic Reform in Colombia”, in H. Costin and H. Vanolli (eds.), 
Economic Reform in Latin America (Fort Worth: Dryden Press, 1998), pp. 217-241; Bell Lemus 
(1998), supra note 57, pp. 98-99. 
71 This had become evident in the widespread strikes and demonstrations across Colombia in the 
1970s-1980s. See especially, C. D. Collins, “Local Government and Urban Protest in Colombia”, 
8 Public Administration and Development 4 (1988), 421-436. 
72 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835-1840) (London: Penguin, 2003). See especially 
on the current view of cities as schoolhouses of democracy, Y. Blank, The City and the World, 44 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 3 (2005-2006), 875-939. 
73 See especially, G. Stigler, “The Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government”, in Joint 
Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, US Congress, Federal Expenditure Policy 
for Economic Growth and Stability (1957), 213-219. 
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localities. As originally formulated by Wallace E. Oates, devolving control over 
the local geography to local governments and actors – and the planning and 
provision of services within this space – would enhance inter-jurisdictional 
competition and innovation.74 According to Oates, a decentralized territorial 
system ensures a level and combination of public services consistent with voters’ 
preferences, while also providing incentives for the efficient provision of such 
services. Finally, reducing the space of development was considered to be the 
most effective way to enforce fiscal federalism. By decentralizing the 
government’s expenditure and tax capture, local administrations and their citizens 
would be obliged to make the necessary esfuerzo fiscal (fiscal effort) to became 
financially sustainable and, therefore, politically responsible towards the overall 
economic viability of Colombia.75 
Reforms to Colombia’s constitution in 1991 instituted the push towards 
economic and political decentralization. The main objectives of these reforms 
were to protect the fundamental rights of citizens, to enable effective community 
participation in public and private decision-making processes, to strengthen state 
institutions and to improve the national economy. Mindful of the state’s uneven 
sovereignty across its territory, the new constitutional text adopted 
decentralization as a core principle. Colombia was defined, in article 1, as a united 
Republic, decentralized, constituted by autonomous local territories.76 While the 
new Constitution recognized two sub-national administrative units – the 
department and the municipality – the latter was identified as the primary locus 
for development.77 The municipality was declared in the new Constitution, article 
311, as ‘the fundamental entity in the politico-administrative division of the 
state.’78 This process of municipalisation aimed to divide the state’s geography 
into more flexible and economically responsive territorial units. Importantly, 
                                                 
74 W. E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972). 
75 See especially on esfuerzo fiscal, Wiesner (1992), supra note 57; R. M. Bird and A. Fiszbein, 
“Colombia: The Central Role of the Central Government in Fiscal Decentralization”, in R. M. Bird 
and F. Vaillancourt (eds.), Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 179-181. 
76 See especially on the meaning and limitations of “territorial autonomy” in the 1991 Colombian 
Constitution, Trujillo Muñoz, (2007), see supra note 4. 
77 In Colombia there are around 1100 municipalities and 32 departments. The department is an 
intermediate administrative level. Although municipalities and departments are the two main 
territorial units identified in the 1991 Constitution, indigenous territories, regions and provinces 
were also created to recognize collective rights to land and to encourage the regrouping of 
bordering departments and municipalities. See Colombian Constitution 1991, arts. 285, 286, 329.  
78 See especially on interpretations of article 311 by the Colombian Constitucional Court, 
Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia de Constitucionalidad 506 (1995), Mag. Carlos 
Gaviria Diaz. See also, Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia de Constitucionalidad, 517 
(1992), Mag. Ciro Angarita Barón; Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia de 
Constitucionalidad 004 (1993), Mag. Ciro Angarita Barón. 
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however, its goal was not to diminish the state’s power: rather, empowering 
municipalities was supposed to invigorate the economic and political fluidity 
required by sovereignty in a globalized era. 
Opposition to decentralization was, and still remains, quite minimal. The 
democratising energies embedded in the process, combined with the prospect of 
having more dynamic economic environments in the municipalities, generated a 
common consensus amongst officials, academics, non-governmental 
organizations, and social movements (including guerrilla groups) about the 
benefits of devolving political, administrative and development responsibilities to 
municipalities. After more than twenty years of decentralization, it is still 
regarded as the most adequate form to revitalize the nation-building project in 
Colombia. Critiques of decentralization are usually framed in terms of how can 
the administrative and fiscal coordination of the process be improved, how can it 
be protected from re-centralizing tendencies by the national government, how can 
it foster more democratic participation and economic efficiency, and how can it 




C.  Decentralization and Sovereignty in Colombia 
 
The emergence of the locality as the ideal space for development in Colombia has 
had consequences beyond a straightforward change in administrative philosophy. 
Several local law and development commentators have described the shift in 
Colombian development policy in quasi-mythical terms: Miguel Borja, for 
example, exalted the new approach as a move from a pre-modern political 
geography to a democratically modern conception of national space,80 while 
Augusto Hernández Becerra affirmed that decentralization and territorial 
development were not simply an administrative reshuffling, but a programme of 
socio-pedagogic construction in which civilization would follow municipalisation 
– literally for Hernández Becerra, ‘ahora municipalizar es civilizar’.81 More 
                                                 
79 See especially supra note 14. See for example on evaluations of decentralization in Colombia in 
which these tendencies can be found, P. Gaitan and C. Moreno, Poder Local: Realidad y Utopía 
de la Descentralización en Colombia (Bogotá: IEPRI, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1992); J. Dugas et 
al, Diversidad y Retos de la Descentralización Local en Colombia, 24 América Latina Hoy (2000), 
45-54; F. Sánchez and M. Chacón, Conflicto, Estado y Descentralización: Del Progreso Social a 
la Disputa Armada por el Control Local, 1974-2002 (Documentos CEDE No. 002184, 
Universidad de los Andes-CEDE, 2005); Gonzalez Salas (2001), supra note 63. 
80 M. Borja, Estado, Sociedad y Ordenamiento Territorial en Colombia (Bogotá: CEREC, 1999), 
p. 18. 
81 A. Hernández Becerra, “Fundamentos Constitucionales del Ordenamiento Territorial 
Colombiano. Reflexiones sobre el Proceso de la Descentralización”, in L. Villar Borda et al, 
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tangibly, however, the translation of development from the state to the 
municipality has led to complex assessments of liability and sovereign legitimacy. 
The Colombian national jurisdiction, for example, is no longer the only subject 
under international scrutiny: municipalities and their citizens are now also 
identified as responsible agents for the widespread underdevelopment, violence 
and indebtedness in Colombia. In the state’s reconfiguration, municipalities have 
not only acquired the burden of the state’s history of political decay and economic 
mismanagement but – as Colombia’s stand-by agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund from 1999 to 2006 demonstrate – they have become contractually 
obliged with the global order to assume responsibility for fiscal arrangements 
previously entered into by the state.82  
Based on their economic adaptability, administrative malleability, direct 
accountability and apparent capacity to achieve financial and environmental 
sustainability, local jurisdictions have been charged with resolving issues that are 
not just national, but issues that are per se global (e.g. the provision of drinking 
water by local governments in an increasingly privatised market or, more 
generally, the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in their local 
context).83 Yet they must also operate within an international system that only 
recognizes nation-states and that increasingly delegates its functions to private 
actors.84 Nation-states continue to be the primary units at the global governance 
                                                                                                                                     
Régimen de las Entidades Territoriales (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2000), p. 
66. 
82 See especially, Banco de la República, Acuerdo de Colombia con el Fondo Monetario 
Internacional (1999-2006), available at: <http://www.banrep.gov.co/publicaciones/pub_fmi.htm>, 
accessed 20 November 2007. See also, Restrepo (2006), supra note 17, p. 378.  
83 See in general on the assignation to the local level the provision of public services, T. F. Allred, 
Financing Water Infrastructure Projects in Smaller Cities of the Developing World: Recent 
Trends (Research Paper, UNDP/Yale Collaborative Programme, 1998 Research Clinic, New 
Haven, 1998), available at: <www.undp.org/pppue/library/files/allred01.pdf>, accessed 26 
October 2007. See on the current responsibilities the local level has in Colombia’s development 
policies (including provision of public services, education and health), H. López Castaño and J. 
Nuñez Mendez, Pobreza y Desigualdad en Colombia: Diagnóstico y Estrategias – Misión para 
Diseño de una Estrategia para la Reducción de la Pobreza y la Desigualdad en Colombia (DNP, 
World Bank, BID, UNDP, CEPAL, CAF, 2007). See on the assignation to the local governments 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, United Nations Development Programme, 
Pro-Poor Urban Governance: Lessons from Life 1992-2005 (2005), available at: 
 <www.undp.org/governance/docs/DLGUD_Pub_lifebook.pdf>, accessed 28 November 2008. See 
especially on the case of Bogotá as the vehicle to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, C. 
López, “Las Capacidades Locales para el Logro de las Metas del Milenio”, in Fundación Konrad 
Adenauer, Gobierno de Ciudades y Política Social en Colombia (Bogotá: Universidad Externado 
de Colombia, 2006), pp. 3-20. 
84 According to Gilliam D. Triggs, even though there are other actors now recognised as having 
limited capacities within the international law system (International Organisations, NGOs, trans-
national corporations and individuals), the state remains the dominant international person and ‘is 
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level, even if at a national level the state has become a coordinating umbrella that 
– at least in theory – balances territorial inequalities and promotes the flourishing 
of individual municipalities. As Yishai Blank has observed, localities are now 
regarded ‘less as public entities, and more as elements of civil society like non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and private corporations and associations 
that have emerged as actors in the international plane.’85 In the decentralized 
development model, localities must therefore follow the principles of financial, 
environmental and demographic sustainability and integral planning in order to 
become economically active, competitive, financially solvent and self-reliant. A 
municipality can achieve such an objective if it maintains an equilibrium – a fiscal 
equivalency according to decentralization theorist Mancur Olson – between its 
political jurisdiction, i.e. the territory under its control, and its economic 
jurisdiction, i.e. its population.86 Following this development pattern, the final aim 
is to form sub-national jurisdictional systems in which sovereign power is 
efficiently present, while embracing and protecting its own population. Thus 
transformed, municipalities are supposed to radiate the benefits of their sovereign 
efficiency to the rest of the nation, and, ultimately, to the rest of the world. In the 
decentralization’s geographical imaginary, the development of localities is a bi-
dimensional process: development within the locality is supposed to spread 
material benefits of economic prosperity to neighbouring districts, while at the 
same time, the municipality sets foot upon the ladder of development, now 
perceived to extend from the local citizen and her local municipality to the global 
stage (see Image 1). The remedy for sovereign weakness is the strategic 
segmentation of the national territory into manageable development units that can 
be linked horizontally (with neighbourhood localities) and vertically (to the 
                                                                                                                                     
likely to remain so for some time’. State recognition plays a ‘dual and circular role in international 
law in acknowledging the legal capacities of international persons and providing a means by which 
international personas can act effectively.’ As a result, ‘a failure to gain recognition leads to a form 
of civil death.’ In principle, ‘the entity is legally non-existent and its activities will have no legal 
effect within the jurisdictions of other states.’ G. D. Triggs, International Law – Contemporary 
Principles and Practices (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006), pp. 208-209. An entity that is 
not recognised by other states will not, for example, have the rights and obligations in the law of 
state immunity, will have limited rights in the international community, and will be not admitted to 
international organizations. See especially, D. J. Harris, Cases and Material on International Law 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed., 2004), p. 146. 
85 Blank (2005-2006), supra note 72, p. 879. 
86 See especially, M. Olson, The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibility 
Among Different Levels of Government, 59 American Economic Review 2 (1962), 479-487. See 
how this idea of fiscal equivalency or integral development has been applied in Colombia, 
Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Evaluación del Desempeño Integral de los Municipios 
2007 (Bogotá: Departameto Nacional de Paneación, 2008). 
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national and the global level) through meticulous development planning and the 




Image 1. A visual interpretation of the new system of overlapping jurisdictions 
envisaged in the current territorial development framework in Colombia. J. M. 
Garcés O’Byrne, Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial: Manual Prospectivo y 
Estratégico (1999), p. 3. 
 
The localization of development has implied a radical exposure of the 
individual citizen to the forces of globalization. As the aspirations and 
benchmarks of development are devolved to the municipality, the citizen is 
increasingly confined to the local level in order to realize her rights. At the same 
time, the citizen becomes more responsible for the locality and the state and the 
interaction of these two with the global order. At this juncture, the underlying 
motivations for the shift from state to local development are laid bare: embracing 
the locality as the locus of development is not only driven by a generalised desire 
for economic progress, but is also a means for the acute disciplining of territory 
and population. From this vantage point, development’s fixation with local 
jurisdictions appears less paradoxical, and more calculating. It is also perhaps 
clear why decentralization has become the preferred politico-administrative tool 
in development’s repertoire to approach territory and population in Colombia, as 
in the Third World more broadly. 
                                                 
87 See on promotion of this type of hierarchical aesthetics as a state-craft practice, J. Painter, 
Prosaic Geographies of Stateness, 25 Political Geography 7 (2006), 752-774; D. Gregory, 
Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994); Ferguson and Gupta (2005), 
supra note 12. See generally on legal spatial imaginaries, N. K. Blomley, Law, Space, and the 
Geographies of Power (New York: Guilford Press, 1994). 
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In the Colombian context, the ideals of locality-driven development have not 
been fully achieved. Instead, the consequence has been the promotion of a 
normative armoury that responds according to a defensive formula of economic 
openness and self-protective territorial politics. Simulating a characterization once 
reserved for Third World states, wasteful and leaking local jurisdictional bodies 
have become synonymous with underdevelopment and weak sovereign 
communities that lack control over their territories. In front of the challenge to 
ensure sovereign presence, in order to achieve an integral and sustainable 
development, localities reacted by bringing their territory and population in neat 
correspondence – the traditional objective of nation-building. The net result has 
been that alongside the multiplication of jurisdictions and the multiplication of 
levels of governance there was also a multiplication of internal frontiers within the 
national geography and the increased surveillance of these borders and territories 
by local administrations, national governments and supra-national institutions. 
This awareness of the territorial body of the municipality, its proper extent and its 
borders, would become a key factor in official responses to Bogotá’s Illegal City. 
Before I move to this discussion, I close this first section by discussing some of 
the technologies and regulations that have accompanied the arrival of the 
discourse of local development in Colombia. 
 
 
D.  Technologies and Regulations of Local Development 
 
To unleash the development potential of Colombian municipalities, the incipient 
decentralized regime required technologies that were able to implement the 
development project at the municipal level. To this end, spatial planning – known 
in Colombia as Ordenamiento Territorial – was chosen as an efficacious 
instrument of development policy.88 Spatial planning has been defined by UN-
Habitat Colombia as: 
 
A process in which a territory is adapted to the needs of its population. This 
process of adjustment requires the formulation of a vision, either objective 
or meta-consensual, and the design of socio-economic and physical-
environmental strategies to achieve such objectives.89  
 
Although spatial planning has been widely used in the United States and 
France since the first half of the 20th century, the European Union (EU) policy 
                                                 
88 See on spatial planning in the 1991 Colombian Constitution, arts. 288, 297, 299, 307, 319, 329. 
89 United Nations Development Programme et al, Formulación y Aplicación de la Ley 388 de 1997 
en Colombia: Una Práctica Colectiva Hecha Realidad (Bogotá: Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda 
y Desarrollo Territorial, 2004), p. 182. [Emphasis added]. 
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tools for jurisdictional construction and territorial development have provided the 
most updated template for the adoption of spatial planning in Colombia.90 As the 
epitome of a jus-political project that reconfigures sovereignty at the sub-national 
and the trans-national level, the EU has relied heavily on spatial governance as the 
policy cornerstone to “make real” the EU’s presence across the continent.91 The 
adoption of spatial planning in Colombia was, in this way, a deliberate strategy to 
re-territorialize sovereign power within the close geography and economic 
conditions of local jurisdictions. As both a technology of and an approach to 
development, spatial planning has been used to surpass earlier development 
efforts that had failed to integrate socio-economic and territorial concerns in the 
nation-building project.  
Spatial planning requires municipalities to synchronize their development 
objectives with effective use and control of their physical territories. Materializing 
the aspirations of development through spatial planning is perceived to be a 
fundamental disciplinary step in order for good governance to take root. 
Development ideals such as human rights and the promotion of the rule of law 
need to be “grounded” in the promotion of financial discipline, local awareness 
about the cost and benefits of infrastructure projects, taxation levels that match 
development expenditures, well-defined urban limits and a clear census of 
development’s beneficiaries within the municipal boundaries. Spatial planning 
thus provides municipalities with an instrument to articulate development within 
their jurisdictions, allowing the physical elements of development to encounter 
municipalities’ socio-economic aspirations.  
At the national level, spatial planning is also a useful policy instrument with 
an enforceable framework that provides the state with a strong territorial presence 
through the disciplining of individual municipalities. In 2001, the Colombian 
                                                 
90 In interviews carried out by the author, Colombian urban planning experts have affirmed that 
they brought Spatial Planning practices into Colombian legislation after academic visits to the US 
and to the EU, in particular to France and Spain, where they completed their post-graduate 
education.  
91 O. B. Jensen, Linking Discourse and Space: Towards a Cultural Sociology of Space in 
Analysing Spatial Policy Discourses, 40 Urban Studies 1 (2003), 7-22. See especially, European 
Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), (Agreed at the Informal Council of Ministers 
responsible for Spatial Planning, Postdam, May 1999); and the Guiding Principles for Sustainable 
Development of the European Continent (CEMAT), (adopted by the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States, 30 January 2002). Although the ESDP has no binding status, and the European 
Union has no formal authority for spatial planning, the ESDP has influenced spatial planning 
policy in European regions and member States, and placed the coordination of EU sectoral policies 
on the political agenda. See also, The European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter (European 
Conference of Minister Responsible for Foreign Planning, 6th Session, Torremolinos, Spain, 19-20 
May, 1983); The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union Document: Towards a 
Stronger European Territorial Cohesion in the Light of the Lisbon and Gothenburg Ambitions 
(European Union, First Draft elaborated 26 June 2006). 
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Department of National Planning, the peak institutional body of development in 
Colombia, made its commitment to spatial planning explicit: 
 
During this period of financial, fiscal, political and social crisis, spatial 
planning is a state policy and a fundamental planning tool. It fosters good 
governance practices, it collectively constructs an integrally developed 
country, and promotes territorial competitiveness amongst territorial units.92 
 
Since 1991, the Colombian Congress has enacted two pieces of legislation 
that marry spatial planning to the decentralized model of development.93 The 
General Act of National Development – Ley Orgánica del Plan de Desarrollo 
(Ley 152, 1994) – is concerned with the criteria, instruments, general aims and 
procedures that the President of Colombia and local mayors should follow in 
order to enact a development plan for their respective jurisdictions and for the 
period of their mandates. In practice, this means that at the national level there 
must be a National Plan of Development and, at the local level, there must be a 
Local Development Plan (Plan de Desarrollo Económico, Social y de Obras 
Públicas).94 The Local Development Plan should follow the general directions of 
the National Plan, but it has significant flexibility to address the particular 
characteristics of the municipality, such as demographics, geography and 
economic conditions. In the language of spatial planning, the Local Development 
Plan is intended to address socio-economic development within the municipality. 
The proper spatial dimensions of development, addressing matters such as the 
location of public expenditures, taxation, land occupation and environmental 
protection, are regulated through a second piece of legislation, the Act of 
Territorial Order – Ley de Ordenamiento Territorial (Ley 388, 1997).95 The Act of 
Territorial Order prescribes directives concerning the scope and implementation 
of a Local Plan of Territorial Order, Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (POT). 
                                                 
92 Departamento Nacional de Planeación, La Importancia del Ordenamiento Territorial en la 
Integración, la Competitividad y el Desarrollo (Documentos para el Desarrollo Territorial No. 41, 
Proyecto: Profundización de la Descentralización en Colombia Col/99/022, July 2001), available 
at: 
<www.dnp.gov.co/archivos/documentos/DDTS_Ordenamiento_Desarrollo_Territorial/3c13_Doc_
41.pdf>, accessed 26 November 2007.  
93 Apart from the general norms discussed in this paper, there is a large succession of normative 
interventions that has deepened fiscal and administrative decentralisation in Colombia. See 
especially on the statutory framework of decentralisation, Ley 60 (1993). See on the 
decentralization of public utilities, Ley 142 (1994). See on the creation of territorial pension funds, 
Ley 529 (1999). See on the rationalization of local public expenditure, Ley 617 (2000). See on the 
rationalization of national budget transfers to the localities, Ley 219 (2000). 
94 In the World Bank’s terminology, the Local Development Plan is translated as City Strategy. 
See especially, The World Bank (2007), supra note 27, p., 3. 
95 This norm was preceded by Colombian Urban Reform Act, Ley 9 (1989). 
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Crucial for the decentralization of development in Colombia, POTs are legal texts 
that summarize the long-term spatial planning agenda of a local jurisdiction.96 
POTs have been defined as ‘the basic instrument for ordering the 
municipality’s territory… the collection of aims, directions, policies, strategies, 
programmes, decisions and norms enacted to guide and administer the physical 
development and the use of the municipality’s territory.’97 Given the crucial role 
of space in the decentralized framework of development in Colombia, Local 
Development Plans must articulate their objectives within the comprehensive 
geographical schema of the municipality’s POT.98 A POT is, in this way, not 
simply a long-term development plan:99 it is a highly regulated, structured and 
institutionalized process for rethinking development spatially and for reshaping 
local realities according to development goals. A POT’s attention to space and 
territory, and to the people and society within that space, endows it with holistic 
ambitions. A POT specifies the physical dimensions of the municipal geography, 
the existing and proposed areas for occupation by urban settlement, rural 
settlement and agricultural production, as well as the planning requirements for 
neighbourhoods within the municipality’s urban jurisdictional boundaries. It 
covers the outcomes of participatory planning with the inhabitants of a given 
locality, budgetary constraints and municipal tax revenues, the location of urgent 
social issues within the municipality, and their relative priority. A POT thus 
encompasses both the development aspirations and the enormous responsibility 
that municipalities have acquired in the decentralization process. 
Local Development Plans and POTs have been part of a response to the 
international trend in development thinking that connected decentralized nation-
building strategies with the imperative to foster ‘conditions for urban 
sustainability’: liveability, competitiveness, good governance, and bankability.100 
In order to equip municipal jurisdictions with appropriate tools to discharge their 
new development responsibilities, POTs and Local Development Plans are 
                                                 
96 Ordenamiento territorial was thus defined according to the Colombian General Act of 
Territorial Order, Ley 388 (1997), art. 5, as ‘a collection of politico-administrative and spatial 
planning decisions enacted by municipalities… in exercise of their public responsibilities 
according to the Constitution and other relevant development laws. Appealing to this normative 
framework, municipalities will have efficient instruments to direct the development of their 
jurisdictional territories and to regulate the utilization, transformation and occupation of this space 
according to socio-economic local strategies of development and in harmony with their 
environment, historical traditions and local culture.’ 
97 Colombian General Act of Territorial Order, Ley 388 (1997), art. 9. 
98 United Nations Development Programme et al (2004), supra note 89, p. 48. 
99 A reduction that might be read into the World Bank’s translation of POT as a Comprehensive 
Long Term Plan. The World Bank (2007), supra note 27, p. 3. 
100 Liveability, competitiveness, good governance and bankability are the key criteria used by the 
World Bank to measure local development capacity. See especially, Kessides (2000), supra note 
22, p. 64. 
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founded on the presumption of an identifiable existing city (la ciudad existente) 
that must be geographically fixed, a physical space where economic resources and 
administrative efforts can be directed in an operative, strategic and selective 
fashion. Here, the geography for legal settlement is technically determined by the 
urban perimeter. This circumscribed space – the new sub-national jurisdictional 
body – is then planned according to principles of integrity and sustainability, twin 
objectives that are meant to ensure a locality’s good governance, competitiveness, 
financial proficiency, social cohesion and common identity for the municipality’s 
residents. Municipalities thus may expand and contract according to their capacity 
to develop their territory and subjects, fulfilling the definition of sovereign spatial 
economy. 
Configuring local development as a spatial sovereign economy has had at 
least two important consequences for development within Colombian 
municipalities. Most apparent is that the area inside the urban perimeter has 
become the development priority, the physical space where commitments to 
financial accountability, efficient resource allocation, public infrastructure 
maintenance and environmental sustainability are enacted and evaluated. 
However, a further urban space has been created through the definition of the 
official development target: an ‘Illegal City’ constituted by informal settlements, 
illegal neighbourhoods, which fall outside the administrative boundaries and 
zoning described in the municipal POT and lie beyond the core of the Local 
Development Plan.  
In Colombia, informal urban settlements are commonly called invasiones, a 
term that conveys two types of legal transgression.101 An invasión may refer to a 
settlement that occurs outside the urban perimeter, or in an area prohibited by the 
municipal POT. In this case, the settlement has been established without official 
planning permission: examples of this type of invasion include the occupation of 
environmentally-reserved areas, regions beyond the municipality’s public 
infrastructure network, or zones that local planning authorities have reserved for 
future urban expansion. Regardless of the situation of the neighbourhood in 
relation to the legitimate possession of property titles, these neighbourhoods and 
their inhabitants contravene national and local urban legislation. Secondly, 
informal settlements that traverse the border between municipalities may also 
constitute an invasión. While the municipal border technically divides the 
settlement between the two adjoining jurisdictions and the informal conditions are 
prevalent in both municipalities, inhabitants may claim membership to a single – 
                                                 
101 Apart from Invasiones, illegal neighbourhoods are also known as barrios marginales and 
barrios piratas. Officially, they are known as barrios informales, asentamientos subnormales, or 
desarrollos ilegales. They are defined as ‘urban settlements where the occupation and 
development of the land has been carried without any planning and contravening required legal 
permits and licences.’ Rueda García and Rueda Sinisterra (2005), supra note 27, pp. 32-33. 
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normally the richer – municipality on the basis of cultural, political or economic 
ties, or for strategic reasons.102 In this case, the illegal residents’ claim 
contravenes Colombia’s general administrative territorial and jurisdictional 
division. In practice, however, distinguishing between types of invasion is a legal 
subtlety: informal settlements – which are a common feature across the 
Colombian urban landscape – are closely linked to the economic conditions of 
their inhabitants and the limited capacity of municipal administrations to offer 
housing solutions for their poorest population. The success of the decentralized 
development model is preconditioned on the effective performance of sovereign 
power at the municipal level, not only to achieve development goals but also to 
police unauthorised urban development that threaten the sustainability and 




III.  BOGOTÁ’S SUCCESS UNDER THE NEW MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
The success of the local development model and the exclusionary outcomes of 
well-functioning sovereign spatial economy are most evident in Bogotá. A large 
number of citizens seek to make a new life in Colombia’s capital, but many of 
them lack the minimum economic resources to legalize their condition (e.g. 
payment for public utilities, land tax or rent). The city of Bogotá, on the other 
hand, has had the administrative power to pursue the integrity and sustainability 
of its legal territory, and to increasingly identify and to exclude illegal 
neighbourhoods from urban development projects.103 Bogotá, at the same time, 
                                                 
102 For example, some irregular settlements south-west of Bogotá are technically part of the 
neighbouring municipality of Soacha (in particular in the area of Altos de Cazucá which is located 
on the border with Bogotá). In Soacha these neighbourhoods are also considered illegal. 
Inhabitants of these neighbourhoods in Soacha, however, constantly claim membership to Bogotá. 
This is because of historical and economic connections to Bogotá and the basic fact that Bogotá’s 
administration controls more financial and administrative resources for social expenditure and 
formalization of illegal neighbourhoods. This claim to membership to Bogotá has been several 
times registered by the author during fieldwork observations and interviews with residents and 
community leaders in the area of Altos de Cazucá. See especially, supra note 29. 
103 For example, Bogotá has consolidated a map (Mapa Único de Prevención y Monitoreo) for the 
strategic surveillance of illegal neighbourhoods. The agency in charge of creating and updating the 
map is the Dirección Distrital de Inspección, Vigilancia y Control de Vivienda, part of Secretaría 
Distrital del Hábitat. The map coordinates the action of several local agencies responsible for 
controlling the expansion of illegal neighbourhoods – including those agencies that are part of the 
Comité Técnico de Legalización, which is the collective organ in charge of neighbourhood 
legalization in Bogotá (see infra note 129). The map summarizes information collected on the 
ground, aerial maps and cadastral maps, into a single electronic map that aims to offer an updated 
version of the number, location and population of illegal neighbourhoods, as well as the areas of 
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has the resources to carefully include its illegal neighbourhood once the city is 
ready for their acceptance. Bogotá is thus a double space: the Legal City – the 
target of development programmes that have made Bogotá into an international 
exemplar of governance – shares its physical geography with an Illegal City, a 
collection of illegal neighbourhoods with a ghostly population ring of almost one 
million people.104 The existence and operation of Bogotá’s legal/illegal binary 
over the city’s territory and population is, in this way, symptomatic of the new 
type of spatial dynamics embedded in the decentralization model. 
In order to make sense of how Bogotá has consolidated a legal/illegal spatial 
arrangement through its commitment to decentralized development, I examine 
here two expressions of the city’s hold over its territory and population. First, I 
analyse the role of cartography in Bogotá’s development policies, norms and 
dynamics. In particular, I am interested in the communicative role of official 
maps. I argue that official maps transmit a shared, yet enforceable, aesthetics of a 
local jurisdiction founded in the maintenance of a sovereign spatial economy, an 
image that dominates the representation of the Legal City in public discourse. To 
complement this discussion, I then examine the neighbourhood legalization 
programmes that formally induct illegal citizens into the body-politic of Bogotá. 
Finally, I identify some features of Bogotá’s experience with local development 
that seem characteristic of a new global regime of sovereignty.  
 
 
A.  Bogotá Gains Strength through Decentralised Development 
 
To situate my critical reflections on Bogotá’s governance of territory and 
population, it is necessary to summarise some aspects of the city’s legal adoption 
of the decentralized development framework. The ideals of autonomy and 
decentralization, territorial planning, and integral and sustainable development 
were grounded at the beginning of the 1990s in a special juridical framework for 
                                                                                                                                     
the city that are at risk of illegal settlement. The map also prioritises the need for control and 
surveillance of these neighbourhoods and areas according to an assessment of urbanization 
dynamics in the area and the history of the area in terms of illegal settlements. Similar strategic 
mechanisms for the surveillance of the establishment and growth of illegal neighbourhoods have 
been implemented by the electricity company and the water company of Bogotá. See infra sub-
section III.C. 
104 See especially, A. Niño Ruiz (2006), supra note 27, p. 36; The World Bank, Project Appraisal 




0094946_03022604021461&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679>, accessed 1 June 
2009; Secretaría Distrital del Hábitat (2008), supra note 27. 
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the city, the Régimen Especial para el Distrito Capital de Bogotá, also known as 
the Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá (Decreto 1421, 1993).105 The statute, which 
serves as a kind of local constitution, identified and regulated the city as the 
Capital District of Colombia (Distrito Capital). With this recognition, Bogotá was 
able to institutionalize its attributes of power in relation to Colombia’s other major 
cities, while the new administrative status allowed Bogotá a high level of 
territorial and financial independence.  
The Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá was articulated further in the city’s POT 
(Decreto 619, 2000 and revised for second time in the Decreto 190, 2004)106 and 
the city’s Local Development Plans: “Formar Ciudad” 1995-1998 (Decreto 295, 
1995); “Por la Bogotá que Queremos” 1998-2001 (Acuerdo 6, 1998); “Bogotá 
para Vivir Todos del Mismo Lado” 2001-2004 (Decreto 440, 2001); “Bogotá Sin 
Indiferencia” 2004-2008 (Acuerdo 119, 2004); “Bogotá Positiva: Para Vivir 
                                                 
105 See for instance in the case of autonomy, Decreto 1421 (1993), arts. 1, 7, 59. See on the case of 
decentralization, Decreto 1421 (1993), arts. 12, 13, 39, 40, 54, 60-95. In spatial terms, one of the 
most relevant effects of the introduction of these legal principles into the administrative and spatial 
logic of the city was the division of Bogotá into 20 localities. The localities received, in addition to 
administrative functions and budgetary allocations, representative authority and autonomy to 
advocate for their population and territory. See especially, Equipo de Servicios Públicos Cinep 
(1993), supra note 27, pp. 50-61. See for instance in the case of territorial planning, Decreto 1421 
(1993), art. 3: ‘The objective of this political, administrative and fiscal norm is to equip the 
Distrito Capital with the necessary instruments for the fulfilment of its functions and the provision 
of the services under its responsibility; the promotion of an integral development of its territory; 
and the improvement of the living standards of its inhabitants.’ Although sustainability was not 
directly mentioned in the Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá, the notion of sustainability as a principle 
that refers to economic, social and environmental development was stated in different parts of the 
norm. For instance art. 12, ‘Attributions: It is the attribution of the Local Council, attending the 
Colombian Constitution and other national norms, to: … 3. Establish, reform or remove rates, 
taxes and contributions; organize tax exemptions; and establish an effective system of tax retention 
and advance payment that aim to guaranteed an effective collection of these resources. 4. Enact the 
necessary organic budgetary norms as well as to enact annually the norms of the income and 
expenses. … 5. Enact the city’s POT, which must include amongst other items, regulation about 
the use of land and the physical development of the city’s urban and rural areas. On the basis of 
these decisions, the Local Council will enact the necessary norms to accomplish these processes of 
urbanization, zonification and the construction of urban infrastructure. … 7. Enact the necessary 
norms to guarantee the preservation and defense of the city’s environmental resources.’  
106 Even though Decreto 619 (2000) and Decreto 190 (2004) diverge at many points and were 
enacted by different mayors (the former by Antanas Mockus, and the latter by Lucho Garzón), I 
refer to both of them as one policy: the POT. In Bogotá, POTs are complemented by plans for 
individual localities and sectoral plans (Planes Maestros) in the areas of education, public health, 
and social well-being; security, justice and defence; culture, recreation and sports; aqueduct, 
sewerage, energy, gas, telecommunications, mobility and public space; secure supply of food; 
cults, cemeteries and funeral services; and exhibition centres. See also on previous laws in Bogotá 
dealing with territorial ordering; Acuerdo 30 (1961); Acuerdo 65 (1967); Acuerdo 07 (1979).  
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mejor” 2008-2012 (Acuerdo 308, 2008).107 Bogotá’s POT follows the Estatuto 
Orgánico’s agenda of greater autonomy and independence from the rest of 
Colombia. As in other Colombian cities, Bogotá’s POT is a framework for 
rethinking and ordering urban development spatially. The POT describes the 
city’s geographical area, articulates a model for occupation by urban settlement, 
rural settlement and agriculture production, specifies long-term budgetary 
commitments, and identifies the population eligible to receive the benefits of the 
city’s development. Complementing the objectives in the Local Development 
Plans, the POT emphasises principles of integrity and sustainability, which are 
intended to bind the city’s territory and development practices together. 
The normative changes that articulated the new administrative framework 
for Bogotá’s governance of territory and population have equipped the city with 
several strategic advantages. First, on a pragmatic level, the Estatuto Orgánico de 
Bogotá and the city’s POT have provided the normative and jurisdictional means 
to organize the use of the city’s territory and to increase rent capture. This, in turn, 
has invigorated the city’s Local Development Plans. The new legislative 
framework restructured public service and created an active network of new local 
councils, while larger budgets and robust processes of planning and accountability 
have promoted a more effective administration. This outcome is partly due the 
World Bank’s presence in Bogotá, 108 which aims to 
 
promote the adoption of clear and internally consistent systems of local 
revenues and expenditures, transparent and predictable intergovernmental 
transfers, prudent conditions for municipal borrowing, and widely accepted 
financial accounting, asset management and procurement practices.109 
 
Second, the broad principles that underpin the norms of decentralised 
development have generated a virtuous rhetoric of economic restraint, 
environmental care, and progressive politics at the administrative level and, 
increasingly, in wider public discourse (see Image 2).110 
                                                 
107 See on a general review of the Local Development Plans in terms of participatory democracy 
and development goals, F. Velásquez and E. González, Encuentros con el Futuro: Cuarto 
Ejercicio de Planeación Participativa en Bogotá (Colombia: Foro Nacional por Colombia, 2004). 
See on social investment in the Local Development Plans: “Formar Ciudad”, “Por la Bogotá que 
Queremos”, and “Bogotá para Vivir Todos del Mismo Lado”, M. A. Restrepo Medina, Impacto 
Social de los Planes de Desarrollo: Análisis de la Inversión Social en Bogotá 1995-2004 (Bogotá: 
Ediciones Rosaristas, 2006). 
108 See for instance, The World Bank (2003), supra note 104. 
109 Kessides (2000), supra note 22, p. 11. 
110 The leading example has been the Citizenship Culture (Cultura Ciudadana), programme, 
initially designed and implemented in the Local Development Plans during Antanas Mockus’s 
mayorships (1994-1997, 2001-2003). However, Cultural Ciudadana has become a key feature 
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Image 2. Symbols for citizens’ self-regulation that accompanied the Cultura 
Ciudadana programme during the administrations (1994-1997, 2001-2003). Placed 
on street banners, public documents or the telephone directory, these symbols called 
for a Bogotá with interior peace, productive, united and legal. Photos taken by the 
author at the exhibition Bogotá, León de Oro 1990-2006, Museo de Bogotá (Bogotá, 
30 November 2006 – 30 April 2007).111 
 
                                                                                                                                     
during the subsequent administrations and Local Development Plans. See especially, Local 
Development Plan, “Formar Ciudad” 1995-1998 (Decreto 295, 1995), art. 7. See also; A. Mockus, 
Cultura Ciudadana, Programa contra la Violencia en Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, 1995-1997 
(Estudio Técnico No. SOC-120, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Washington D.C., Julio 
2001); A. Mockus, Education for Learning to Live Together: Co-Existence as Harmonization of 
Law, Morality and Culture, 32 Prospects (2002), 19-37; A. Mockus, Anfibios Culturales y 
Divorcio entre Ley, Moral y Cultura, 21 Análisis Político (1994), 37-48; A. Mockus, Anfibios 
Culturales, Moral y Productividad, 3 Revista Colombiana de Psicología (1994), 125-135. 
111 See especially on the visual work that accompanied the Culture Citizenship programme in 
Bogotá, M. Granados (with texts by A. Mockus, I. Chermayeff and X. Bermudez), Carteles y 
Signos Gráficos Urbanos (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá & Empresa de Teléfonos de Bogotá, 
2003). 
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Operating as a new moral code for the city, these principles of decentralized 
development have been mobilised by the city’s administration to construct a 
common conscience, such that living and working in the city constitute a 
contractual engagement to abide by Bogotá’s ideals of integrity and sustainability. 
Administrative, fiscal and environmental disciplines have become linked to the 
active promotion of a common urban identity, and the introduction of disciplinary 
mechanisms that aim to establish patterns of self-government amongst Bogotá’s 
citizens. The success of Bogotá’s local leadership model, which combines 
progressive politics and economic governance, has become a case study for recent 
investigations.112 
Finally, the combination of Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá, the city’s POT 
and Local Development Plans have confirmed that urban land is not simply the 
backdrop for economic and social activities. Rather, these legal texts represent 
Bogotá’s urban territory as the essential platform upon which urban, regional and 
global development must be idealised and planned. According to Carmenza 
Saldías Barreneche, ex-Director of Bogotá’s Planning Department, the 
transformed understanding of territory has allowed Bogotá successfully to pursue 
development, autonomy and decentralization as ‘a venture for regional and global 
integration.’113 
Perhaps the most telling sign of Bogotá’s robust normative and 
administrative control over its territory and population is the city’s Triple A 
(AAA) sovereign credit rating, which makes it the premier borrowing power in 
Colombia.114 Triple A is the highest rating available from international credit 
rating organizations, and its attainment proclaims an entity’s creditworthiness and 
ability to borrow on international bond markets. Traditionally conceded to 
corporations, credit risk ratings have increasingly become the acid test of a 
government’s political stability, territorial security, and economic 
sustainability.115 The name “sovereign credit rating” is apt, since its achievement 
                                                 
112 See for example, G. Martin and M. Ceballos, Bogotá: Anatomía de una Transformación: 
Políticas de Seguridad Ciudadana 1995-2003 (Bogotá: Editorial Pontífica Universidad Javeriana, 
2004); T. N. Clark, “Transforming Political Systems and Political Culture: What Works? Lessons 
from Bogotá and Cities around the Globe”, in Fred Lazin et al (eds.), Local Government Reforms 
in Countries in Transition: A Global Perspective (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), 39-54; 
United Nations Development Programme (2008), supra note 6.  
113 Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., Revisión del Decreto 619/2000 (Bogotá: Departamento 
Administrativo de Planeación Distrital, 2004). 
114 Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., Análisis del Estado de la Deuda Pública del Distrito Capital, 
Administración Central (Bogotá: Secretaría de Hacienda Distrital, Dirección de Crédito Público, 
2005), p. 36, available at: 
 <www.shd.gov.co/pls/portal/url/ITEM/175FF6AC86748650E040B40A14023873>, accessed 22 
July 2007. 
115 See on sovereign credit ratings, R. Cantor and F. Packer, Sovereign Credit Ratings, 1 Current 
Issues in Economics and Finance 3 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1995), 1-6; D. Mehta and 
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marks the strength of a nation’s – or, in this case, a city’s – sovereign control over 
its affairs. 
Bogotá’s Triple A rating flags both the city’s creditworthiness and 
international investor confidence, confirming Bogotá’s overall ability to provide a 
secure investment environment, even though it is part of a country that is 
considered to be economically and politically dysfunctional. Fulfilling 
international expectations about the proper use and operation of sovereignty 
within a global economy, Bogotá has managed to obtain sovereign recognition 
from international financial institutions and private investors, who distinguish its 
territory from Colombia’s more problematic market and social landscape. 
It is important to note, however, that Bogotá’s increasing power does not 
entail a reduction of Colombia’s sovereignty. What can be perceived in the 
attainment of a Triple A sovereign credit rating is the use of “sovereignty” as a 
mystical referent. Sovereignty is brought to mind without the classical 
connotations of combative relations between nation-states. Rather, sovereignty is 
presented as a governance capacity, materialized in spatial and classificatory 
practices, that holds together a spatial unit in which territory and population are 
enhanced and empowered to receive global economic flows. Bogotá in this 
context has simply reframed Colombia’s President Álvaro Uribe’s (2002-2006, 
2006-2010) claims that ‘the state is the most important private enterprise’ and ‘the 
public is like a universe of shareholders’ within the context of its municipality.116 
It is now possible to see how Bogotá has come to speak the language that 
was previously used only by the state. In official reports, Bogotá’s administrators 
claim that they will establish ‘pacts and alliances’ with other territorial entities in 
order to maintain geographical and regional competitiveness.117 Furthermore, 
Bogotá regards itself as part of regional and international organizations, and 
belongs to a network of cities that aim to position localities as global actors.118 
Bogotá redefines itself by constructing its spatiality with other cities, regions, 
national jurisdictions, and international financial institutions. The city, or at least 
the Legal City, has actively become a building block of a new global order.119 The 
                                                                                                                                     
H. G. Fung, International Bank Management (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publ., 2004), pp. 206-244; 
B. Scholtens, “Country Risk Analysis: Principles, Practices and Policies”, in M. Frenkel, A. 
Karmann and B. Scholtens (eds.), Sovereign Risk and Financial Crisis (Berlin: Springer, 2004), 3-
27. 
116 See especially, “Extreme Investing: Inside Colombia”, Business Week, May 28, 2007, available 
at: <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_22/b4036001.htm>, accessed 14 
February 2009. 
117 See especially, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., Desarrollo Social de Bogotá (No. 1) (Bogotá: 
Secretaría de Hacienda Distrital, Dirección de Estudios Económicos, 2006), p. xxiii. 
118 Blank (2005-2006), supra note 72, p. 930. 
119 A significant official response to Bogotá’s new position within this new global order is the 
recently established Department of International Relations – Dirección Distrital de Relaciones 
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territorial entity that emerged from Bogotá’s Estatuto Orgánico, the POT and 
regulated by Local Development Plans has been thus financially and 
administratively capable of superseding its initially normative character. In the 
next two sections, I turn to the examples that I have selected to illustrate the way 
in which this new spatial and material reality of Bogotá has been based on 
furthering state-based practices of classification, demarcation and disciplining of 
territory and population. 
 
 
B.  Mapping Development  
 
As a modern technology of jurisdiction creation, mapping transforms social place 
into a commensurable and manageable spatial unit that is amenable to sovereign 
control and management.120 Maps allow the legal space of a jurisdiction to be 
imposed upon a physical space, inserting social reality into an enabling juridical 
framework, while they shift attention away from their own constructed nature.121 
This has given maps a particular place in the history of the construction of modern 
states because they produce both filial images and concrete administrative spaces 
to control and regulate.122 In the context of local development, the mapping of a 
territory – with its corresponding technology, spatial planning – erects over the 
local populace a verifiable space where development can be pursued and 
evaluated. Borrowing from cartography’s state-based history, mapping the local is 
                                                                                                                                     
Internacionales – within the administrative organization of Bogotá. The main objective of this 
department is ‘to design and promote policies and strategies to strength further Bogotá’s 
international relations with other cities, states and international organizations’. See especially, 
Acuerdo 163 (2008), art. 4. Another example is Acuerdo 147 (2005) which confirmed Bogotá’s 
membership to the following regional organizations and networks formed by cities: Centro 
Iberoamericano de Desarrollo Estratégico Urbano (CIDEU) <www.cideu.org/>; Unión de 
Ciudades Capitales Iberoamericanas (UCCI) <www.munimadrid.es/ucci/>; Asociación América-
Europa de Regiones y Ciudades (AERYC) <http://www.aeryc.org/ingles/objetivos.htm>. 
According to the same act, Acuerdo 147 (2005), Bogotá became a member of The World 
Organization of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) <http://www.cities-
localgovernments.org>. The mission of UCLG is: ‘To be the united voice and world advocate of 
democratic local self-government, promoting its values, objectives and interests, through 
cooperation between local governments, and within the wider international community’, available 
at <http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/index.asp?pag=template.asp&L=EN&ID=6>, 
accessed 12 July 2007. 
120 S. Dorsett, “Mapping Territories”, in S. Dorsett and S. McVeigh (eds.), Jurisprudence of 
Jurisdiction (Oxford: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), p. 137. 
121 C. Jacob, The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography throughout History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 11. 
122 See especially, J. C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); R. T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A 
History of Jurisdiction), 97 Michigan Law Review 4 (1999), 870. 
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the logical extension of the state’s decentralization as a nation-building strategy. 
Through mapping, local territory and population are made more amenable to 
economic, environmental and social planning, while development’s territorial 
arrangement is simultaneously established as the natural order of things. 
Facilitated by digital technology, and with a smaller territory and population to 
care for, the mapping of local space and life becomes more precise and integrated 
with the multiple faces of development: for instance, the local map can be 
integrated with the distribution of population and local economic activity, and this 
map can be superimposed on present and future infrastructure facilities or 
environmentally protected areas (see Image 3). Through this exercise, direct 
contact between the sovereign power and citizens is minimized by the technical 
nature of maps – which intervenes from a distance – while the outcomes of 
development can be amplified.  
Maps, especially cadastral maps, are used to regulate taxation and public 
expenditure according to average household incomes, land value and political 
leverage.123 They ensure that the city is strategically present in each of its subjects 
and over its population as a whole.124 They coordinate the achievement of a 
sovereign spatial economy in Bogotá. The capacity of the city to provide better 
services, such as security, education or public utilities, across its territory is 
connected with the capacity of the city to tax its population effectively – a 
population whose members are more inclined to contribute to the city’s 
development costs once they start to receive the city’s services according to their 
needs, uses and contributions. An example of this is that, alongside Bogotá’s 
improvement in its development standards, the city has increased its collection of 
taxes from the equivalent of 200 million US dollars in the 1990s to 750 million in 
2003. Maps in this process play a crucial role both to identify taxpayers and to 
coordinate the strategic redistribution of benefits within the Legal City’s 
perimeter. What comes after is a virtuous circle of taxation and investment, 
political representation and sovereign presence. 125 
                                                 
123 The idea that maps assist Bogotá’s administration to decide on the appropriate level of 
investment and taxation according to household income, land value and political leverage has been 
confirmed by the author during informal conversations with public servants of Bogotá’s 
departments with development roles. 
124 Compare with, R. J. P. Kain and E. Baigent, The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: A 
History of Property Mapping (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
125 A. Mockus, Creating Civic Agency and “Cultural Change” (Paper presented at Moving 
Beyond Armed Actors, The Challenges for Civil Society in Colombia, Programme on Nonviolent 
Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS), Weatherhead Center for International Affairs 
(WCFIA), Harvard University, February 20-21, 2004), pp. 10-11, available at:  
<http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ponsacs/seminars/colombiaconferencepapers/default.asp>, 27 July 
2007. 
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Image 3. The graphic shows the different levels of information presented in the digital map of Bogotá: from basic geographical 
characteristics to the city’s administrative division, urban facilities, property titles, and the city’s socio-economic distribution. 
Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., Mapa Digital (Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo de Catastro Distrital, 1996), p. 26. 
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On the other hand, the maps that accompany the normative body of Bogotá’s 
POT and Local Development Plans retain the memory of the city’s socio-political 
construction as a uniform, manageable, and self-sustaining territorial unit. The 
maps are a product of the marriage between decentralized development principles 
and the law, and their legal character makes them the centre of the city’s 
development practices. The ceaseless process of drawing and revising maps of the 
city systematises the physical urban space according to legally enacted 
development objectives and a jurisdictional perimeter. Their capacity to abstract 
territory and population strengthen administrative action, turning these 
components of the living city into reciprocal variables of development. In official 
publications, title disputes, urban policy manuals and neighbourhood legalization 
processes, these maps appear as reminders of where Bogotá is, and what it must 
look like.  
The maps included in Bogotá’s POT are thus a particular visual 
representation of the normative organization of development within the city’s 
legal perimeter. Through these maps, Bogotá’s cartography is legally codified and 
reality is reorganized according to the aims and conditions of development. They 
classify and situate the city’s residents within an urban perimeter and then assign 
them to human development units (Unidades de Planeación Zonal). They 
pinpoint the locations of present and future urban infrastructure (facilities, public 
spaces, transport lines), and dissect the terrain into natural environment, human 
settlements, public spaces, country lands and no-residential zones.126 Decisions 
about public projects and their beneficiaries are made on the technical 
specifications of the maps and the spatial and normative reality that they portray 
(see Image 4). Over these maps, public officers, private investors and public-
private partnerships negotiate decisions about where to invest and how 
development will take place within the life of the city. Maps are, as a result, an 
avenue to communicate and to profit from the official vision of the city as a 
uniform, manageable, and self-sustaining territorial unit.  
For instance, Image 5 presents a map of the city as depicted in an advertising 
campaign by a private developer of residential housing. The map recycles the 
image of Bogotá that is promoted in the city’s POT and Local Development 
Plans: a city that is well-defined by an environmental green belt and not by illegal 
neighbourhoods or eroded lands, that is uniformly developed across its internal 
area and that is interconnected through the city’s public transport system, its 
improved network of roads and the city’s airport. Moreover, the map de-places 
Bogotá from its location within Colombia, removing the city from the problematic 
nation-state that it belongs to. 
                                                 
126 See especially, Decreto 619 (2000), art. 103; Decreto 190 (2004), art. 56. Zonification in 
Bogotá had been applied since Acuerdo 21 (1944). This initial norm of zonification was modified 
several times (1951, 1961, 1967, 1974, 1979, 1990). 
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Image 4. Bogotá’s official land use map. Bogotá’s POT, Decreto Distrital 190 
(2004). 
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Image 5. Map by private housing developer Amarilo, published in the commercial magazine: Avianca en Revista (September 
2009). The map has been also reproduced in Amarilo’s marketing magazine, Amarilo Magazine, No. 18 (July 2009), pp. 8-9, 
and the company’s website: <http://www.amarilo.com>, accessed 19 October 2009. 
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Following official discourse, the private developer’s map represents the 
jurisdiction of Bogotá in its best possible light: a developed city to be desired by 
(present and future) residents and investors. In this hyperreal illustration of the 
city, the benefits of promoting the Legal City – established in official 
development prescriptions – are organized for the developers’ profit, and for the 
circulation of capital and labour across the city, its space and its frontiers. The 
reality that lies beyond the private developer’s map is elided by the drive towards 
a new image of the city and what can be obtained from it. In this sense, the motto 
used by the private developer in the map – “A space only exists when someone 
builds it” (Un espacio solo existe cuando alguien lo crea) – is peculiarly apt. The 
map conveys the exercise of sovereign power that the model of decentralized 
development aspires to: a firm sovereign control over territory and population that 
is nonetheless compatible with a flexible approach towards market forces and its 
disciplines.  
For Bogotá’s officials, residents and investors, maps mark where the Legal 
City finishes, establishing who is within and who is beyond of the city’s 
development reach. The same maps also find their way into the life of the Illegal 
City and its residents, where they remind these subjects what the city looks like, 
how it excludes them and how they might ultimately be included. For illegal 
neighbourhoods, a relationship with Bogotá’s planning agencies implies a 
discussion that focusses on the topographic coordinates of each illegal house 
according to Bogotá’s official cartography, the legal instruments that signal their 
illegality and a precise procedural path for the neighbourhood’s illegal citizens to 
become legitimate subjects – how they might become lawful in front of Bogotá’s 
administration. This demonstrates how the cartography of development actualises 
an administrative architecture over the Illegal City such that a continuous network 
of power connects the vigilance of the sovereign – through administrators, 
planners and cartographers – to the meticulous regulation of territory and 
conduct.127 
While neighbourhoods are still illegal, and with no expectation to be 
legalized in the near future, maps confirm for the residents their exclusion and the 
reasons why they do not have an effective right to receive, for example, a proper 
water service from the city. From the perspective of illegal residents, the maps are 
thus a platform to demonstrate their exclusion and vulnerability, and to request 
formal integration. The project of inclusion is, in this way, formulated by the 
cartographic grammar of the Legal City, such that the citizens of these 
neighbourhoods construct their own maps to rectify the gaps of the official 
versions, carrying with them both the official and their own version of maps to 
                                                 
127 T. Osborne and N. Rose, Governing Cities: Notes on the Spatialisation of Virtue, 17 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space (1999), 747. 
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show how they have been disappeared from official readings of the city and to 
testify that their neighbourhoods do indeed exist.  
In my fieldwork visits to illegal neighbourhoods on the periphery of Bogotá, 
community leaders have shown me their own maps alongside official maps, not 
only to demonstrate the condition of their exclusion, but also their readiness to be 
included on the city’s own cartographic terms (see Image 6). Even as official 
maps exclude them, actively ignoring the existence of their neighbourhoods, the 
residents of illegal neighbourhoods pre-emptively map themselves according to 




Image 6. A map made by residents of an illegal neighbourhood on the periphery of 
Bogotá. Following official cartographic standards, this community map identifies the 
location of the neighbourhood in relation to the surrounding city, the number of land 
blocks in the neighbourhood, which of them are empty, which ones have been built, 
and which are built and occupied. The map also shows the zonification of the 
neighbourhood following official categories: environmentally reserved zones, high 
risk of landslides zones, and zones adequate for human habitation. Finally, the map 
identifies areas of public space and urban equipment that has been built by the 
community. Photo taken by the author (11 August 2009). 
 
In conclusion, the mapping process that determines the boundaries between 
the Legal and the Illegal Cities embodies the paradoxical nature of the relationship 
between sovereign power and Bogotá’s urban revolution. On the one hand, the 
maps’ depiction of the city’s jurisdiction might be read as an innocuous tool to 
visualize the spatial location and distribution of Bogotá’s territory: a simple aid to 
identify land uses and the implementation of infrastructure projects. However, 
urban planning maps also consolidate an image of the official Bogotá for the 
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city’s decision-makers, its residents and its investors. Any remanent sense of the 
arbitrariness that sustains the determination of the city’s development boundaries 
– and in particular the sovereign decision of where the Legal City finishes and the 
Illegal City begins – is supplanted by a drastic graphical reduction that clearly 
exists and must be maintained for the benefit and welfare of Bogotanos. Social 
reality is not magically disappeared: rather, it is classified, organized and 
ultimately buried under the layers of technical official cartographies that seek to 
promote development within the perimeter of the Legal City. Bogotá’s 
development maps, as a result, do not solely mark a territory. They frame spaces 
and urban life according to the laws and policies that generate development and 
promote the city within a new global system of sovereignty. 
Bogotá’s development maps can be seen as the pinnacle texts in which 
development processes take place, and where the decision about who will be a 
beneficiary and participant in development projects is ultimately taken. These 
maps mark the geographical and demographical area of the city that has 
succeeded in the consolidation of sovereignty control over territory and 
population. For the excluded, the same maps constitute a material sign of their 
exclusion that can be contested, fought over and discussed. Supported by the 
power of the maps, the initial arbitrariness of fracturing the territory into a Legal 
and an Illegal City becomes a compelling instrument that defines, protects, and 
occasionally enlarges the sovereign body of Bogotá.  
 
 
C.  Maintaining a Sovereign Spatial Economy 
 
For many Colombians, Bogotá’s illegal neighbourhoods are an important stage in 
their migration to the Legal City. The process of neighbourhood legalization 
constitutes a kind of pilgrimage that is regulated by development objectives, a 
juncture where the law that sustains Bogotá’s success and the individual’s desire 
for membership to the Legal City coincide, and where the pace and the obligations 
of inclusion are determined.128 Trading on an illegal community’s anticipation of 
the Legal City’s benefits, the legalization process promotes the order that is latent 
                                                 
128 Bogotá’s Local Development Plan “Bogotá Positiva: Para Vivir Mejor” 2008-2012, Acuerdo 
308 (2008), article 32: Metas de la Ciudad, regularizes explicitly this pilgrimage. The Plan 
identifies (i) 104 illegal neighbourhoods on the fringes of the city; (ii) 458 neighbourhoods that are 
in the process of legalization and, as a result, waiting for the formalization and provision of basic 
public services and infrastructure from Bogotá; and (iii) 1313 formerly illegal neighbourhoods 
pending an integral upgrade of their infrastructure and services. According to the aims of the Plan 
and its financial scope: (i) 73 of the 104 illegal neighbourhoods will begin the process of 
legalization in the period 2008-2012; (ii) only 51 of the 458 neighbourhoods in the process of 
legalization will start receiving formal provision of basic services and infrastructure; and (iii) 150 
of the formerly 1313 illegal neighbourhoods will be integrally upgraded. 
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in Bogotá’s development plans and calibrated through the development maps of 
the city. This occurs in the course of a legal process that is designed to endow the 
future citizen with a very specific set of rights and obligations derived from his or 
her reception into the Legal City, a process highly regulated by a body of 
particular norms and a specialized network of local departments.129 Importantly, 
neighbourhood legalization processes have been also recently coupled with large 
programmes of urban upgrade.  
The Desmarginalización programme was established during Enrique 
Peñalosa’s mayoral term (1998-2001) with the twin objectives of consolidating 
the process of neighbourhood legalization and improving living conditions in 
Bogotá’s newly legalized neighbourhoods.130 The US$522 million allocated to the 
programme was used to legalize and upgrade the urban conditions within these 
neighbourhoods, which were home to approximately 620,000 inhabitants. 
Desmarginalización financed the construction of infrastructure, promoted projects 
to increase the use of existing urban facilities (for example, to link 
neighbourhoods to Bogotá’s primary public transport system Transmilenio), and 
relocated families living in high-risk areas to alternative housing when possible.131 
During the second administration of Antanas Mockus (2001-2004), 
Desmarginalización was succeeded by Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios 
(Integral Neighbourhood Improvement), a similar programme that has been 
continued and expanded during the administrations of Lucho Garzón (2004-2008) 
and Samuel Moreno (2008-2012).132 Like Desmarginalización, Mejoramiento 
                                                 
129 The offices directly in charge of neighbourhood legalization in Bogotá are Subdirección de 
Legalización y Regularización de Barrios, which is part of Bogotá’s Habitat Department 
(Secretaría Distrital del Hábitat) and Dirección de Legalización de Barrios, which is part of 
Bogotá’s Planning Department (Secretaría Distrital de Planeación). The office in the Habitat 
Department is in charge of managing the process of legalization, while the office in the Planning 
Department is in charge of taking final decisions in the process. Even though these two offices are 
directly responsible for neighbourhood legalization, they coordinate their actions and take 
common decisions in a collective body: Comité Técnico de Legalización. The Comité has a legal 
character and it is formed by the offices of Bogotá’s Habitat and Plannign Departments in charge 
of legalization, and their peers in Bogotá’s Department of Environment, Department of Risk 
Control, offices related to public housing (Metrovivienda and Caja de Vivienda Popular), and the 
water, electricity and gas companies. The Cómite convenes once a month to review the 
legalization viability of illegal neighbourhoods and to review the stage of the legalization process 
of illegal neighbourhoods that the Comité has already decided to include in the Legal City. See 
especially, Bogotá, Decreto Distrital 367 (2005), art. 5. 
130 Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., Programa Desmarginalización de Barrios. Informe de 
Gestión 1998-2000 (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2000). 
131 Rueda García and Rueda Sinisterra (2005), supra note 27, p. 67. 
132 See especially, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C. and Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (KfW), 
Proyecto de Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios SUR con Bogotá: Propuesta Actualizada de 
Intervención (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2000). See especially on Mejoramiento 
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Integral de Barrios employs an integral developmental approach to 
neighbourhoods that are selected for legalization, but this is complemented by 
increased attention to the welfare aspects of neighbourhood legalization.133 As a 
general strategy, Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios has targeted the construction 
of infrastructure that is likely to raise human development indices, while 
furthering programmes of community consultation and institutional enhancement 
in order to foster co-responsibility agreements that involve communities in 
policing the growth of the Illegal City.  
Although Desmarginalization and Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios have 
adopted slightly different approaches to sustainable principles, they have both 
worked under the assumption that neighbourhood legalization is a crucial process 
to regularize the city’s urbanization. The purpose of the programmes has been to 
consolidate the legality over the urban land; both programmes have aimed to 
further the expansion of the Legal City and cultivate more strategic approaches to 
future illegal growth. In particular, the programmes combine an active interest 
from the city’s administration to legalize informal neighbourhoods with the 
promotion of neighbourhood legalization as a normative and selective process. 
The notion of selectivity aims to communicate to present and future illegal 
residents that the city’s administration will not legalize all existing illegal 
neighbourhoods, that it will only legalize illegal neighbourhoods according to the 
city’s norms and the city’s financial and administrative capacity, and that the city 
is committed to not having new illegal neighbourhoods established in the future. 
Selecting neighbourhoods for legalization protects Bogotá from excessive or 
precipitous incorporation of its Illegal City, but also transforms the process of 
legalization into a pedagogical display in which illegal subjects can learn the 
nature and mechanics of development in the Legal City.  
Bogotá’s administrations and legislative bodies have, in this way, enacted 
specific criteria that illegal neighbourhoods must fulfil in order to be legalized. 
Two important preliminary criteria regulate the neighbourhood legalization 
process. First, a settlement that applies to become legal (or that the district selects 
for legalization) must have been established before a certain date: settlements 
established after this deadline cannot apply to become legal until the Council of 
Bogotá revises the eligible timeframe. Under the Desmarginalización and 
Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios programmes, the cut-off date was 1996, 
although this has been recently extended to mid-2003.134 Second, the geographical 
location of the illegal settlement must comply with the norms of land use 
established in Bogotá’s POT. Hence, it is only possible to legalize settlements that 
                                                                                                                                     
Integral de Barrios during Lucho Garzón administration, Bogotá, Decreto Distrital 367 (2005) 
and Samuel Moreno administration, Bogotá, Acuerdo Distrital 308 (2008). 
133 Rueda García and Rueda Sinisterra (2005), supra note 27, p. 67. 
134 Colombia, Decreto 1600 (2005), art. 57. 
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are in designated urban expansion or rural areas: settlements, or even sections of 
these settlements, within public interest areas, environmentally-protected zones or 
high-risk regions cannot be legalized.135 
If an illegal neighbourhood meets the initial criteria for legalization, three 
additional conditions regulate the neighbourhood legalization process. First, 
neighbourhood legalization does not imply the normalization of property titles: it 
is purely legalization concerned with irregular urban developments.136 As a result, 
civil and criminal actions may accompany the administrative process of 
neighbourhood legalization.137 Second, before a neighbourhood is legalized, it 
must be spatially organized according to Bogotá’s urban development plans. For 
example, a group of illegal settlers who initiate the administrative procedure of 
legalization for their community must show that 25 percent of the urban area 
within the neighbourhood is available for public space. If this amount of public 
space is not available, the residents of the illegal neighbourhood must pay 
Bogotá’s administration for the development of an equivalent area of public space 
in another part of the city.138 Third, once the neighbourhood has been re-
organized, city’s departments in charge of the legalization process establish 
additional individual obligations for households to fully legalize their houses, to 
obtain the property title of their land, to stop building without adequate permits, to 
connect them to public utilities, and to commence payment of taxes.  
By managing the number and quality of new legalized settlements, Bogotá’s 
administration regulates the expansion of the Legal City. The conditions that must 
be met by newly legalized neighbourhoods help to maintain a sovereign spatial 
economy in Bogotá, as they secure a balance between growth – of both population 
and territory – and the city’s development capacity, which is ultimately what 
safeguards the city’s sovereign presence across its jurisdiction. In the 
neighbourhood legalization process, the abstract search for sovereign 
consolidation that drives the decentralization of development in Colombia 
structures the reality of the city’s almost-included citizens and territory. 
                                                 
135 See especially on how environmental sustainability has been used to support the removal of 
neighbourhoods in Bogotá’s Illegal City, M. Everett, The Ghost in the Machine: Agency in “Post-
structural” Critiques of Development, 70 Anthropological Quarterly 3 (1997), 137-151. 
136 See especially, Colombian Urban Reform Act, Ley 9 (1989). 
137 For instance, civil actions can by used by residents – during or after the legalization process – 
to access the property title of the land. Criminal and civil actions can be also started against 
residents by legitimate owners to get their property back. Finally, criminal actions can be started 
by legitimate owners and the city’s administration against the people that initially organized the 
establishment of the informal neighbourhood – who are known as urbanizadores piratas in 
Colombia. See especially, Muñoz Neira (2004), supra note 27.  
138 To guarantee this obligation, the office in charge of neighbourhood legalization in Bogotá 
requires that community members sign a public document in which they agree to observe this rule. 
The sum is paid to the Fondo Compensatorio de Cesiones Públicas para Parques y Equipamento. 
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Sovereignty here comprises a set of practices that order time and space, 
determining who should belong to the Legal City and when such inclusion 
becomes possible. As Gupta has observed, the temporal and spatial dimension in 
the performance of sovereignty is significant because it enables authorities – in 
this case, officials in Bogotá’s development departments in charge of legalizing 
neighbourhoods – to invest processes of jurisdictional crossing with a durée, a 
dimensionality in time that identifies the physical space as a regulated domain.139 
Insofar as the city assumes responsibility for nation-building and strives to solve 
the fragility of the state, the security of the city’s development borders and the 
sustainable integration of what lies beyond of them have become key elements in 
the material reconstruction of the state’s sovereignty.  
What is remarkable, however, is that this process involves the integration of 
terrain that is already part of the national territory, and citizens who are already 
subjects of the sovereign. What occurs here is thus not the enjoyment of 
recognition in an emergent system of sovereign promotion within the Third World 
– exemplified, for instance, by Bogotá’s attainment of Triple A sovereign credit 
rating. Rather, it is an intensification of the disciplinary effects of recognition, a 
translation of practices that have been traditionally used by nation-states to 
confirm their sovereignty at an international level to a sub-national scenario. In 
this way, the legalization process provides a constant reminder of the benefits, as 
well as the obligations, of Legal City membership. Through the process, citizens 
on the verge of becoming legal residents are instructed about what the city has to 
offer and what the city will require from them. Here, the question of lawfulness, 
how to live a lawful life, within the confines of the Legal City and its disciplines 
becomes acute. 
The use of maps by the city’s administration within the neighbourhood 
legalization process is also revealing at this point. The process of neighbourhood 
legalization mandates that several community meetings must be organized. 
Officers from Bogotá’s planning and development agencies use these meetings to 
inform residents about the general conditions that regulate the neighbourhood 
legalization process and the benefits and obligations derived from the legalization 
of a community’s neighbourhood. They also emphasise the need for participation 
by the community, which ensures that the process gains momentum and the 
formalities of the process can be fulfilled (e.g. that 51% of the residents of the 
neighbourhood approve the legalization maps). In the context of these meetings, 
official maps of Bogotá in which illegal neighbourhoods are not included are 
usually placed alongside official versions – not community versions – of the same 
illegal neighbourhoods (see Images 7-8).  
 
                                                 
139 A. Gupta, “Imagining Nations”, in D. Nugent and J. Vincent (eds.), A Companion to the 
Anthropology of Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 279-280. 
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Image 7. The photo shows residents of an illegal neighbourhood confirming on an 
official map of Bogotá that their neighbourhood effectively does not exist in the 
official cartography of the city. Photo taken by the author during a neighbourhood 




Image 8. The photo shows a resident of an illegal neighbourhood checking the 
location and measures of her property in the legalization map of her neighbourhood. 
A version of this map will be included, at the end of the legalization process, in the 
official map of the city. Photo taken by the author during a neighbourhood 
legalization meeting (19 September 2009). 
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The official versions of illegal neighbourhoods are maps drawn up by the 
administration in the context of the legalization process, and they portray the area 
of a neighbourhood that can be legalized and the measures of each of the 
individual blocks of land within this area. Residents are repeatedly asked to 
consult the two sets of maps, which depict their current illegality and their future 
outlook in the map of the city, in order to verify the accuracy of their inclusion in 
the city’s official cartography and affirm their willingness to become part of the 
city. As part of the legalization process, each resident must confirm the name of 
their neighbourhood, the measurements of their house, the existence of facilities 
in the neighbourhood, the general boundaries of the neighbourhood, the amount of 
public land that the neighbourhood will give to the city, as well as their general 
consent to be regularized and included in the official map – and life – of the Legal 
City. 
Within the process of neighbourhood legalization, maps become the place of 
recognition, where subjects negotiate themselves in relation to the city, even 
though the scope of this negotiation is conditioned by neighbourhood legalization 
norms, the legal character of the maps, and the subjects positioning as “illegal” in 
front of the city. For the public officers in charge of neighbourhood legalization 
meetings and the residents, the maps are the preferred place to confirm the 
resident’s current condition of exclusion and the terms of their inclusion. 
Comparing, checking, approving these maps, and visualizing themselves as part 
of the city, is a vital part of the pedagogical exercise of becoming legal, and 
accepting the responsibilities of such a step. 
It is important to note that the community’s ultimate acceptance of these 
maps, and the obligations that come out of the legalization process, is driven by 
the desire of the residents to change the material and subjective conditions of their 
illegality. Although Bogotá lacks the capacity to provide proper social services, 
housing and security within the Legal City itself, expectations about the benefits 
of legalization fuel the desires of the residents of illegal neighbourhoods. This 
desire for inclusion is fostered and re-used by the administration of the city. To 
illustrate this point, a couple of pages from an official brochure describing the 
neighbourhood legalization process are shown in Images 9 and 10.140 
 
                                                 
140 Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital, Su Barrio Legal!!! (Bogotá: Alcaldía 
Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2006), p. 3. 
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Image 9. Front-cover, Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital, Su 
Barrio Legal!!! (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2006). 
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Image 10. Normative pyramid, Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital, 
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The brochure, which was produced by Bogotá’s departments in charge of 
neighbourhood legalization and distributed around 2006-2007 to the residents of 
these communities, summarizes the conditions and steps of the legalization 
process through images and text. In the brochure, legalization is defined as the 
process to obtain access to “the modern and human Bogotá”, (Bogotá moderna y 
humana). Inclusion within Bogotá moderna y humana is represented as a 
movement towards ascendance and progress, stimulating the dreams, desires and 
perseverance of illegal dwellers to legalize their homes. 
Neighbourhood legalization is presented at the same time as a regulated and 
consistent administrative process, depicted in the brochure by a five-tiered 
normative pyramid (see Image 10). At the base of the pyramid is the right to 
housing, protected by article 51 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution, and an 
acknowledgement of the Constitution as Colombia’s foundational norm where 
both human rights and citizens’ obligations are enacted. The rules and process of 
legalization in Bogotá occupy the apex of the pyramid (Decreto 367, 2005). The 
intermediate stages of the pyramid consist of the national act that establishes 
territorial control by municipal POTs (Ley 388, 1997), the local act that 
establishes Bogotá’s POT (Decreto 190, 2004), and the national decree that places 
time constraints on access to the process of legalization (Decreto 1600, 2005). 
Confronted with this hierarchical array of norms, the illegal neighborhood 
and its inhabitants do not suffer from a lack of attention from the state or the 
absence of law. Instead, they are confronted by law’s ‘very powerful presence’.141 
The normative pyramid is intended to confirm the illegality of the subject in 
relation to Bogotá’s Legal City vis-à-vis Colombia’s legal order. Colombia does 
not abandon its local (illegal) subjects, but rather assigns them to a further process 
of regulation by the local administration.  
In the brochure, neighbourhood legalization proffers admission to Bogotá 
moderna y humana as the end of an objective process in which the subject will be 
vested with rights and tangible benefits, provided that she organizes her spatial 
and political conditions according to Bogotá’s sovereign spatial economy, which 
is concomitant with Colombia’s development order. Recognizing and locating 
illegal desires within a space of normative certainty, the force of law – as 
portrayed in the brochure – promises to rationalize the volatility of the illegal 
resident’s claims for inclusion within the Legal City and channels them into the 
service of a coherent, sustainable and integral development framework. The city 
of Bogotá operates here as both a space of development and as a platform to foster 
a new kind of citizenship. Neighbourhood legalization is the transaction through 
                                                 
141 S. Silbey, “Let Them Eat Cake”: Globalization, Postmodern Colonialism, and the Possibilities 
of Justice, 31 Law and Society Review 2 (1997), 209. 
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which Bogotá is able to – or aspires to be able to – redeem those living beyond its 
official map on the city’s own terms.142 
Bogotá’s exercise of sovereignty over its territory and the population that 
resides beyond its jurisdictional boundary appeals openly to the liberal theory of 
the limitation of sovereignty by law, or, to use a more apposite phrase, the 
sovereignty of law. The fact that Bogotá comes into being through law in the 
moment of legalization allows the city to frame the discussion about 
neighbourhood legalization in purely legal and rational administrative terms. 
Politics is disregarded, since it is considered to be dependent upon irrational and 
arbitrary human desires, and denies law’s apparent autonomy and its role in the 
achievement of a coherent sovereign presence at the local level.143 Politics, the 
grammar that negotiates human desires, are subsumed by law as governance in 
order to ensure Bogotá’s development. 
How the city manages access to potable water in neighbourhoods that are 
about to be legalized is a useful final example to summarize the disciplines 
involved in the city’s exclusion, and careful integration, of its de facto citizens via 
legal regulations. In principle, being located outside the urban perimeter implies a 
contractual impossibility with Bogotá’s water company, and the absence of water 
infrastructure is the hallmark of an illegal neighbourhood. The provision of water 
services has thus become a key object for regulation in the context of 
neighbourhood legalizations. According to Resolución 0194 (8 March 2007) 
adopted by Bogotá’s water company, access to potable water can now be 
provisionally provided to neighbourhoods that were completed before the 27th 
June 2003 (i.e. the same date that is the settlement deadline for neighbourhood 
legalization).144 Other illegal settlements have no choice but to continue, 
“stealing” water from the Legal City’s aqueduct. This discrimination occurs even 
though the text of the same Resolución 0194 recognizes United Nations 
conventions, Colombian Constitutional norms, and jurisprudence from the 
Colombian Constitutional Court that establish the provision of drinking water as a 
fundamental human right.145 Moreover, the water company admits publicly that 
the illicit connections made to its water pipes cause continuous dripping that 
provokes landslides, which in turn cause numerous deaths per year. Following the 
rationale of Resolución 0914, however, the legal presence of Bogotá’s 
jurisdictional boundary and the city’s commitment to the development principles 
of municipal integrity and sustainability prevent the water company from offering 
                                                 
142 See especially on development’s logic of redemption and, in general, development’s 
theological underpinnings from a Law and Development perspective, Beard (2007), supra note 20, 
p. 15. 
143 A. de Benoist, What is Sovereignty?, 116 Telos (1999), 110. 
144 Resolución Acueducto de Bogotá 0194 (2007), supra note 33. 
145 Ibid. 
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a universal service. This denial of service ensures the financial performance of the 
water company, which is still owned by Bogotá and constitutes the city’s most 
valuable asset.146  
Maintaining the discussion in normative and purely administrative terms, the 
Legal City via its water company usufructs from marking and excluding what is 
beyond its official map. The open political question “why is proper potable water 
services unavailable in illegal neighbourhoods?” is answered with an 
administrative-legal response that obscures the fact that the city obtains benefits 
once rights are strategically regulated.147 As in the case of the private developer’s 
map that we considered earlier (Image 5), a market logic is here combined with a 
tight sovereign control over the city’s territory and population. Law synchronizes 
this encounter of purposes by functioning as a de-personalized and de-politicized 
set of good governance standards. Scrutiny of law’s role in this scenario is 
deflected because law acts as both the vehicle and the objective of development, 
especially when it is seen as part of the promotion of the rule of law. 
These complications become more acute once the regulation of water 
provision within the Illegal City, as established in Resolución 0194, is considered. 
The Resolución requires that illegal neighbourhoods receiving water from 
Bogotá’s aqueduct sign co-responsibility agreements, which engage peripheral 
communities to protect the newly installed infrastructure. In addition to paying for 
their access to water, the community is expected to exercise effective surveillance 
over other illegal citizens who attempt to access the official water system. If a 
community that is signatory to such a co-responsibility agreement fails to prevent 
illicit connections, then they are obliged, according to the Resolución, to pay 
damages to the water company.148 These co-responsibility agreements not only 
seek to maintain the financial sustainability of the water company and the Legal 
City, but they also configure an instructive lesson in decentralised development, 
and the idea of what a lawful life is in this new model of nation-building. While 
the neighbourhood legalization process, its maps and brochures operate at a more 
                                                 
146 Bogotá’s water company, Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá (EAAB), holds a 
financial ranking of AAA according to Fitch Ratings Colombia S.A. Its financial capacity is based 
on the natural monopoly of the water service over the Legal City of Bogotá and 11 neighbouring 
municipalities, which represent a market of more than 1.7 millions of clients (that covers more 
than 8 million people). By the end of 2008, the net income of the company was around USD $110 
millions. Today the company expands its business activities beyond the central region of Colombia 
and internationally. See especially, “Como por entre un tubo”, Semana.com, 2 May 2009, 
available at: <http://www.semana.com/noticias-economia/como-entre-tubo/123600.aspx>, 
accessed 21 October 2009. 
147 See especially, S. Pahuja, “Rights as Regulation: The Integration of Development and Human 
Rights”, in B. Morgan, The Intersection of Rights and Regulation: New Directions in Sociolegal 
Scholarship (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 167-191. 
148 Resolución Acueducto de Bogotá 0194 (2007), supra note 33, arts. 3-4. 
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subtle level, these co-responsibility agreements transmit a clear normative 
message to infringing subjects – whose “crime” is a failure to prevent other 
subjects from accessing a right guaranteed to them by the Constitution – about the 
importance of Bogotá’s integrity and sustainability in relation to the 
reconstruction of Colombia from the city’s peripheral margins and subjects.  
As we have seen, instead of the usual sharp disjunction employed by 
national practices of sovereign power, the neighbourhood legalization process 
departs from the illegality of the subject to organize her careful inclusion around 
arguments of empowerment and co-responsibility. Neighbourhood legalization 
processes, framed in the larger projects of Desmarginalization and Mejoramiento 
Integral de Barrios programmes, intend to include the city’s illegal subjects 
through a series of reflexive exercises in which their inner selves become the final 
object of legalization. The legalization process and its accompanying activities 
aim for the germination of a new kind of citizen in those Colombians who are 
destined to become Bogotanos. At the core of neighbourhood legalization 
processes is an attempt to establish a harmony between the individual (who learns 
the importance of responsibility for her actions), the locality (newly empowered to 
exercise effective surveillance over its legal and illegal subjects), the region (that 
operates as an articulated quilt of self-sustained jurisdictions), the nation (that 
serves as a coordinating governance umbrella), and the globe (which turns on the 
shoulders of a responsive local citizenry). 
 
 
D.  Consequences of the New Regime of Sovereignty 
 
The previous sections of this paper have argued that the Illegal City is an 
important and resilient feature of Bogotá’s urban development plans and a 
symptom of a new regime of sovereignty. In agency terms, the Illegal City is a 
response to housing needs and the search for economic engagement. At the 
structural level, however, its raison d'être is more complicated. As this paper has 
tried to demonstrate, unpacking the dynamics that constitute the Illegal City and 
the processes that regulate a coordinated inclusion of the Illegal City illustrate 
some of the logics behind the push to revitalize nation-building in the Third 
World through the decentralization of development. 
The Illegal City unfolds beyond the governable space where development 
can take place. Its symbiotic relationship with Bogotá is embedded in the 
practices by which sub-national, national and supra-national units are defined and 
preserved, and underpins a global governance project that is articulated through 
the discourse of development and calibrated through legal forms and uses. The 
Illegal City is thus where the discourses of capitalism, human rights, democracy 
and security encounter each other in both their full extent and in their own 
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impossibility. Faced with these impossibilities, national and local law respond by 
establishing what fraction of these ideals can be obtained in fact. By shifting the 
limitations of development to the boundaries of the city, a space is created for the 
Legal City to exist. Through law, the Legal and the Illegal City are made to 
appear as a natural arrangement; essential in order to maximize results. Through 
law, the legal subject is connected with the global order while the illegal subject 
must wait. Law sets the standards of what a lawful life means in this new model 
of sovereignty and spatial organization.  
Bogotá’s Legal City can be seen as part of a global project to multiply 
integral and sustainable sovereign units that can profit from globalization while 
simultaneously solving sovereign weakness in Third World states.149 The city’s 
subjects perform their existence, and they are constituted in a sub-national 
political body that ensures its integrity and sustainability only when it has 
become, in the vocabulary of the World Bank, livable, competitive, well-managed 
and bankable.150 Performing in a space rendered intelligible to national, regional 
and global flows of cultural, political and economic exchanges, the citizen 
becomes both the space and the subject of sovereignty. Here, democracy, human 
rights and the promotion of the rule of law are manifestations of a system of 
political representation and empowered citizenship within the confines of the 
corporate homeostasis of the Legal City. This is clearly unrelated to the 
emergence of sovereignty as collective self-determination: rather, self-
determination appears as the restricted right of an identifiable minority that can 
take advantage of citizenship within the governable urban space. 
In this way, Bogotá’s territorial organization and development are, 
unsurprisingly, closely linked to income, class and territorial positioning.151 In the 
current paradigm of development, socio-spatial inequalities reinforce tendencies 
toward the fragmentation of social identity. Cohesion at the affluent end of the 
social structure contrasts with the multiplicity and dispersion of social groups 
across the less affluent parts of the Legal and Illegal City. The shift from a 
political economy of highly centralized states and import substitution to a new 
model of development in which local governments and, increasingly, private 
actors with public functions are crucial to the lives of the population has been 
effective and yet debilitating.152 Bogotá’s legal and illegal citizens, no longer 
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united by grand political agendas or class alliances, must find new ways to survive 
using a mixed bag of individual moralities and selective co-operation approaches 
that allow them to navigate a terrain founded on asymmetrical power relations. As 
Gutiérrez observes: ‘Bogotá is not a rebel city, it is just a dangerous one.’153 
In summary, the beneficiary of current local governance discourses is not an 
exceptionless citizenry that includes the poor, the underclass, or the newly arrived. 
Rather, as Marcus and Gamboa have argued, it is the latter-day bourgeoisie, the 
professional middle classes, upon whom the governance of cities depends and to 
whom the new system of sovereignty bestows most of its benefits.154 In this new 
scenario, three possible subjects can be identified.  
First is the fully capable, legal citizen of Bogotá. This citizen is who, in 
addition to living in the Legal City, is himself a trained subject who can enjoy the 
intersections of exchange that synchronize him with corporeal, urban, regional 
and global fashions. For him, the new hold of sovereign power in the city is 
positive, not problematic, and the distancing of the city from the nation-state is 
reassuring. The entrance of market logics and actors that help the state to 
consolidate its presence across territory and population is sound and effective. He 
is the emblem of current urban planning discourses and practices. For him, the 
city works as a bi-directional valve, a crossing point that facilitates transactions 
that emanate from his body, pass through the municipality, the department, the 
region, and the national territory, finishing at the global level, and then returning 
on a trajectory promised by the images that accompany contemporary local 
development manuals in Colombia (see Image 1).  
Second is the legal citizen that remains disempowered, unemployed or 
underemployed, or simply trapped in the everyday structural violence of the Legal 
City. In 2004, more than 40 percent of Bogotá’s legal population were still 
classified as poor, and nearly 10 percent lived in extreme poverty, the majority of 
whom were residents of non-consolidated areas, where the Legal City spills over 
into the Illegal City.155 For all these citizens, the door of Bogotá’s development 
remains problematically open. 
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Third is the illegal Bogotano. Although his daily life may be similar to that 
of the disadvantaged legal citizens, he is officially targeted for exclusion in order 
to protect the integrity and sustainability of the city. His displacement allows the 
Legal City to succeed and to organize his future entry into the body politic. 
Trapped between the sovereignties of the nation-state and Bogotá, the illegal 
Bogotano is effectively shadowed by the legal system and the very discourses of 
development that aim to make Bogotá efficient, governable and sustainable for its 
legal population. The benefits that the illegal citizen can obtain through his 
exclusion (e.g. occasional access to free public utilities, not paying taxes, or 
ignoring building regulations) must be weighed against the costs of his 
segregation: his peripheral location in relation to the core of the city; his location, 
sometimes, in the Illegal City of a much poorer neighbouring municipality, which 
implies a complete denial of a future legalization in Bogotá and a very low chance 
of being legalized or his neighbourhood properly upgraded by his official 
municipality; his marginal location in the market; his daily fears about insecurity 
and unemployment; and, most of the time, the anxieties of occupying a block of 
land that is at high risk of landslide or forceful evacuation by public authorities. 
In the development process of multiplying governance jurisdictions and 
identifying them according to territorial and demographic particularities, 
disciplinary effects are intensified. Forces of inclusion and exclusion are 
generated that instruct subjects about their rights and obligations according to 
their jurisdictional membership. The legal citizen is brought closer to believe in 
and learn the truth of development, while the illegal Bogotano remains spatially 
displaced at the point of encounter between Colombia and Bogotá. Here, he is 
reminded about both his general constitutional rights as a Colombian (for 
instance, his right to potable water) and the incapacity of the state to fulfil these 
expectations. The illegal citizen is, in this way, warned about his legal alienation 
from Bogotá and the negative consequences that this fact entails for the fulfilment 
of his national constitutional rights by the city’s administration. He must wait for 
the future time when he is admitted under the rules and obligations that Bogotá 
determines for him. 
Each of these three broad categories of citizens is engaged with Bogotá’s 
development and Colombia’s new model of nation-building, its spatial 
organization, its benefits and its exclusionary effects. Walking over the legal 
limits of the city, or declaring that their material effects are indistinguishable, are 
not necessarily acts that result from structural blindness or deliberate rebellion. 
Instead, they may simply involve an acknowledgment of the arbitrariness of these 
borders and the saturation of disciplinary practices that sustain the city as a 
governable space. As Richard Ford has argued, jurisdictional borders ‘are both 
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absolutely compelling and hopelessly arbitrary’: on the one hand, borders respond 
to a sovereign spatial economy that maintains the governable space that is 
necessary for disciplining subjects within and beyond its jurisdiction; on the other 
hand, these same borders are energized by a will to sovereign power that in itself 
remains imperceptible and erratic.156 These characteristics of sovereign power 
seem today more compelling, once we reflect upon the current triangulation 
between the recovery of the nation-building project through local development, 
the highly technical management of population and territorial affairs by local 
governments, their discourses and laws, and the increasing role of market forces 





Bogotá’s successful development and its power to exclude the Illegal City from its 
development targets should be read as a response to the perception that nation 
states in the Third World are oversized, unsustainable and unevenly developed 
jurisdictions that cannot effectively intervene in the economy in favour of 
development objectives, nor maintain a proper presence over their territory and 
population. The city’s control over its borders and the consequent exclusionary 
nature of its development achievements reflect the search for a sovereign spatial 
economy by Colombian municipalities. Functioning analogously to national 
frontiers or city walls of former times, the city’s development statutes and its 
planning borders foster the careful administration of territory and population, 
reproducing nation-building logics within a local jurisdiction.  
Bogotá’s effective use of Colombia’s current legal framework for 
development – a claim that cannot be made by other municipal administrations in 
Colombia – highlights the ambiguities sustaining the international move from 
state-based to municipality-based development. The displacement of the Illegal 
City demonstrates the partiality of a new global regime of sovereignty that seeks 
increasingly smaller, more accountable sub-national administrative units.  
Bogotá’s experience does not entail a reduction of Colombia’s sovereignty, 
but rather represents a multiplication of the opportunities for population 
disciplining. Here, sovereignty is invoked without the classical connotations of 
combative relations between nation-states. Instead, it is presented as a set of 
practices that binds together a spatial unit in which territory and population are 
enhanced and empowered to receive global economic flows. Bogotá’s peculiar 
skill in mastering a sovereign spatial economy thus resides in the city’s capacity 
to maintain a corporate geography, the Legal City, in antagonistic co-existence 
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with the Illegal City. This is a relation by exception: the Illegal City is a place 
where development, in its official guises, must not reach, and Bogotá’s success 
depends upon this exclusion.157  
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that this relationship is not 
incidental or foreign to development. Binary constructions, such as north/south, 
citizen/alien, legal/illegal and developed/underdeveloped, are familiar to 
development discourses. The peculiar novelty in the case of Bogotá is how 
successive recent administrations have harnessed and enhanced the disciplinary 
outcomes of these binaries at the local level in order to successfully develop 
Bogotá’s Legal City and manage the integration of its illegal twin. This illustrates 
how global governance as a deterritorialized historical phenomenon is a 
chimerical presumption that supposes international relations to have moved 
beyond the Westphalian model of state politics. On the contrary, the international 
system of sovereignty described in this paper has as one of its main features an 
intensification of the territorialisation of governance. This occurs due to the 
increasing coordination between spatial technologies, legal norms, and social 
managerial discourses, an encounter that is adumbrated in the use of maps in 
Bogotá’s development. In the coupling of space and governance, there is an 
entrenchment of politics as territorial calculation, an effort to determine the space 
that surrounds us.158 The current trend of decentralizing development gives some 
clear signals of how this territorial calculation may triumph at the cost of 
abandoning the nation-state as a broader political platform. 
The argument advanced here demonstrates that although the construction of 
territorial “walls” brings exclusion per se, concepts such as decentralization, 
integral planning and sustainable development, supported by spatial planning 
technologies and bureaucratic processes of population management, continue to 
promise that each wall, each limit, will bring a new liberty.159 Development 
norms, interventions, and institutions need to be scrutinized from their 
geographical components in order to see how development based on the 
multiplication of jurisdictional boundaries inevitably involves demarcation, 
exclusion and control. The urge to multiply governable spaces where sovereign 
power is effectively present is inseparable from the corresponding multiplication 
of boundaries and levels of governance. The construction of limits can ensure 
political compliance, productivity and membership, but it also presupposes the 
creation of others who must be colonized, instructed and, finally, conditionally 
accepted according to development’s ambitions. If the purpose is to re-politicise 
the analysis of these consequences, an initial step is to hold to account the 
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allegedly innocuous nature of the geographical artefacts and imaginaries that 
underpin Law and Development interventions in the Third World.160 
While this paper has mainly described Bogotá’s development as an 
irresistible and coordinated exercise, this process suffers from the same anxieties 
as any other exercise of authority. Bogotá and Bogotanos, those within and those 
beyond its map, are continually created by specific practices to play different roles 
within larger processes of political legitimation, economic production and cultural 
revision, some of which I described in this paper. Nevertheless, it remains to study 
in more detail how Bogotá’s subjects, within and beyond its official map, subvert 
such constructions in the private space of the self that is a precondition for the 
contemporary exercise of sovereign power. These stories, however, must be told 
in more detail at a later opportunity. 
The research agenda ahead is extensive. Apart from a detailed assessment of 
agency in the case of Bogotá, further examinations of the theoretical ideas 
presented in this paper would be useful. The relations that I have sketched 
between nation-building and development, the transformations of the state and its 
power through the delegation of responsibilities to local governments and the 
welcoming of market forces, actors and logics, and the decentralization of 
development as an expression of a new model of sovereignty all require critical 
evaluation. Additional studies of decentralization as a discourse are also 
necessary. They can further our understanding of how decentralization as a 
process of territorial control and disciplining is presented, the power/knowledge 
dynamics that sustain it, how local actors embrace the discourse to consolidate 
their position, and how others, especially at the national level, reject 
decentralization in order to reclaim their role as superior authorities. More 
straightforward would be a comparative analysis of other cities and states 
following some of the arguments presented in this paper. As well as examples 
recognized for their development success, it would be also instructive to analyse 
local histories where success has not been achieved: what are the consequences of 
failure in the decentralized model of development? How does the unsuccessful 
municipality relate to the state and the international, and how it is disciplined? 
Comparative studies would clarify the mechanics of exclusion in different 
scenarios, the broader logics that underpin contemporary development rhetoric 
and its norms, and also illuminate the tension between the increasingly technical 
management of population and territorial affairs by local governments, the 
apolitical appearance of this new style of governance and its excessive reliance on 
the law. These possible avenues for future research pose important questions for 
the millions that have been re-territorialized into local jurisdictions. This paper 
has outlined the parameters of urban experience for some of those who have been 
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brought closer to an allegedly post-national moment – an apparent historical 
turning point in which the spaces and forms where we have organized our modern 
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